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COMPETENCY TESTING AND POTENTIAL
CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLANGES OF
"EVERYSTUDENT"
Monique Weston Clague *
Mandatory minimum competency testing programs that would deny
secondary students a high school diploma for failure to demonstrate a des-
ignated level of skills in reading, writing, and mathematics have been pro-
posed or implemented at the state or local level in approximately one-third
of the states.' Congress has recently entered the scene as a support player.2
* Associate Professor, University of Maryland at College Park. B.A. Swarthmore
College, 1959; Ph.D. Harvard University, 1969. The author wishes to express appreciation
to the General Research Board of the University of Maryland for providing a grant which
partially supported research for this article.
1. See C. PIPHO, STATE ACTIVITY MINIMAL COMPETENCE TESTING, (1978) cited in
Haney & Madaus, Making Sense of the Competency Testing Movement, 48 HARV. EDUC.
REV. 462, 462 (1978). Pipho, a testing expert who monitors developments in competency
testing for the Education Commission of the States in Denver, Colorado, also notes that 36
states have passed legislation or school board resolutions relating in some way to minimum
competency testing, although not necessarily relating to diploma requirements. 10 Report
on Educ. Research No. 25 (Dec. 13, 1978).
The literature on the educational and political merits of competency testing is growing
rapidly. See, e.g., NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, THE FLORIDA ACCOUNTABILITY
PROGRAM: AN EVALUATION OF ITS EDUCATIONAL SOUNDNESS AND IMPLEMENTATION
(1978); The Minimum Competency Testing Movements, 59 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 585 (1978);
Competencies as the Aim of Education, 35 EDUC. LEADERSHIP (1977) (collection of articles
on competency testing); Fey & Ruchkin, Project Basic.- The Promise and the Problems, 35
MD. TEACHER 6 (1978); Haney & Madaus, Making Sense of the Competency Testing Move-
ment, 48 HARV. EDUC. REV. 46 (1978) and sources cited therein [hereinafter cited as Haney
& Madaus]; J. Baratz, Policy Implications of Minimum Competency Testing (Oct. 12, 1978)
(paper presented at the Second Annual American Education Research Association Topical
Conference in Washington, D.C.) [hereinafter cited as Policy Implications]; J. Baratz, In
Setting Minimal Standards Have We Abandoned Concerns for Equity and Access? (July
1978) (paper presented at Wingspread Conference, Racine, Wisc.).
2. See Education Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-561, 92 Stat. 2143 (codified at
20 U.S.C.A. §§ 2701-3389, (West Supp. 1979)) (extending and amending the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 27 (codified in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.)).
Title II of the amendments purports to assist state and local educational agencies to improve
the basic skills of all children. 20 U.S.C. § 2881 (Supp. III 1979). The definition of basic
skills includes not only reading and mathematics, but also "effective communication, both
written and oral." Id Title IX, Pait B, empowers the Commissioner of Education to make
grants to any state educational agency (or local agency if the state has not submitted an
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Some of the more ambitious programs look beyond testing for basic skills
and functional literacy 3 and may attempt to assess certain activities and
attitudes implicating highly value-charged notions of what constitutes a
minimally competent adult. Assessment of attitudes and skills that have
been suggested or are under development include appreciation of "beauty"
and "cooperation," 4 "personal development, social responsibility, and ca-
reer development," 5 "citizenship," "leisure skills," "parenting," "the world
of work, '"6 the "ability to pursue higher education or to gain employ-
ment,"7 and "lifelong learning and attitudes toward school." 8
Considerable attention has focused on the equal protection implications
of competency testing for racial and linguistic minorities9 and to some ex-
application), in order to assist students to achieve educational proficiency standards in read-
ing, writing, mathematics, as well as in "other subjects which the applicant considers appro-
priate for testing." Id § 3331. Under these provisions, state and local educational agency
applications for federal assistance are optional. Periodic testing of students for proficiency
in any subject deemed appropriate by the applicant agency is likewise optional. Id. Part B
of Title IX does not explicitly rule out federal grants for state plans requiring students to
pass a proficiency examination as a prerequisite for graduation. It does, however, require
that state or local plans contain assurances that any student who fails a proficiency examina-
tion will be offered "supplementary instruction in the subject matter covered by such exami-
nation." Id. § 3331.
3. Functional literacy refers to the application of reading, writing, and mathematical
skills to "routine tasks of the adult world." Baratz, Policy Implications, supra note 1, at 15.
4. Id. (identified by public in Montana as skills to be assessed).
5. Haney & Madaus, supra note 1, at 467 n.d (Oregon).
6. MARYLAND STATE DEP'T OF EDUC., PROJECT BASIC: MARYLAND COMPETENCY-
BASED PREREQUISITES FOR GRADUATION (1977) (statement of competency goals and rec-
ommended timetables).
7. Haney & Madaus, supra note I, at 467 n.c (New York).
8. See Policy Implications, supra note 1, at 15.
9. The first federal court challenge to competency testing, the case of Debra P. v.
Turlington, No. 78-892 (M. D. Fla., filed Oct. 16, 1978), is a class action suit filed by ten
black students. The plaintiffs allege that Florida's functional literacy testing law violates the
equal protection and due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment, as well as Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-6 (1976). Attorneys with the
Center for Law and Education are reportedly offering advisory assistance to the Bay Area
Legal Services of Tampa, which filed the suit. Report on Educ. Research, Nov. 1, 1978. In
March of 1979, a Florida appellate court upheld the scoring by which mastery of basic skills
and satisfactory performance on the functional literacy component of the state's 1977 com-
petency test was measured. Florida State Bd. of Educ. v. Brady, 368 So. 2d 661 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1979). The unsuccessful complaint alleged that the scoring criterion was set in viola-
tion of the State's Administrative Procedure Act, FLA. STAT. § 120.54 (West Supp. 1974-
1978). Florida is the first state to condition high school graduation with a conventional
diploma on passing a competency test. A class action challenge on behalf of 1 th and 12th
grade blacks, poor whites and native Americans to the constitutionality of North Carolina's
statewide competency test has also been filed, alleging a denial of equal protection and due
process. 60 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 472 (1979). See generaly McClung, Are Competency Pro-
grams Fair? Legal?, 59 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 397 (1978); McClung, Competency Testing.-
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tent for handicapped students.' 0 This article examines instead alternative
constitutional bases for challenges by "everystudent"; that is, challenges in
which questions of fairness on the basis of race, sex, national origin and
handicap are not central issues. Part I focuses first on threats posed by
value-oriented testing to the constitutionally-protected freedom of expres-
sion, including the right to remain silent. Next it examines the threat
which such testing may pose to the judicially-recognized right of personal
privacy. Part I concludes with a discussion of the appropriate remedies for
first amendment and privacy violations. Part II considers the likelihood of
successful legal challenges by "everystudent" to the basic skills or func-
tional literacy and mathematics exams that are arguably arbitrary, capri-
cious, or fundamentally unfair, and thus violative of substantive due
process rights. I I
I. How MUCH SHALL BE RENDERED TO THE EDUCATIONAL CAESAR?
ASSESSING ATTITUDES AND BELIEFS
.4. First Amendment Questions
In the celebrated decision of Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School
District,12 the Supreme Court held that high school students could not be
suspended from school for wearing emblems of protest, absent a showing
that their mode of expression "would substantially interfere with the work
of the school or impinge on the rights of other students."' 3 Students, the
Court emphasized, do not shed their first amendment rights of expression
Potentialfor Discrimination, I I CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 439 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Com-
petency Testing]. For a criticism of McClung's involvement in the competency issue, see
Getz & Glass, Lawyers and Courts as Architects of Educational Policy. The Case of Minimal
Competency Testing, 62 THE HIGH SCHOOL JOURNAL 181 (1979) and McClung's reply, Law-
yers, Courts and Education Policy. The Real Case of Minimal Competence Testing-A Re-
sponse to Getz & Glass, 62 THE HIGH SCHOOL J. 243 (1979).
10. See, e.g., McClung & Pullin, Competency Testing and Handicapped Students, 12
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 922 (1978).
11. Both the first amendment and privacy claims discussed in Part I highlight points of
tension between legalism and the values of liberalism. See J. SHKLAR, LEGALISM 1 (1964).
If legalism is defined as the social ethos which prizes adherence to preexisting rules and the
establishment of rights and obligations under rules, liberalism challenges, in the interest of
personal freedom, undue repressiveness which may be embodied in duly enacted rules or
laws. The substantive due process claims discussed in Part II, on the other hand, highlight
the tension between legalism-the foe of unregulated arbitrariness--and the counterclaims
made for reposing judicial trust in the discretion of educators.
12. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
13. Id at 509. This loosely formulated standard governing suppression of student ex-
pression is more restrictive of expression than the "imminent lawless action" test, the
Supreme Court's most recent first amendment standard governing suppression of speech by
members of the public in public forums. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447
1979]
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at the schoolhouse gate;' 4 they "may not be confined to the expression of
those sentiments that are officially approved."' 5 Hence, if students may
not be suspended for affirmative, though silent, nondisruptive protest, may
they be downgraded or possibly even denied a high school diploma for
expressing views on high school graduation tests which deviate from spe-
cific attitudes and values that state testing authorities assume to be correct?
Individual responses to value-oriented questions implicate numerous polit-
ical, cultural, vocational, and interpersonal values. Absent the possibility
of validation, no one answer should be satisfactory. A student's expression
on competency tests of personal sentiments that are not officially approved
can hardly be regarded as an interference with the rights of other students.
Furthermore, the educational goals of the school system should never j us-
tify downgrading expression of unapproved sentiments, in violation of a
student's first amendment rights.
16
In January, 1977, the Maryland State Department of Education ex-
pressed an official philosophy of education in two brochures entitled The
Mission of Schooling 17 and Project Basic.'8 These policy statements
broaden the concept of minimum adult competence far beyond mastery of
"basic skills"-"the ability to read, write and calculate"-and include
competence in four other "areas of human activity" ("citizenship," "the
world of leisure," "survival skills,"-including "inter-personal skills" and
"parenting,"-and "the world of work") and have served as the point of
departure for a process of developing "competency-based prerequisites for
graduation" in Maryland by 1982.19 In the fall of 1977, a draft list of ap-
proximately 600 competencies was generated by advisory panels of profes-
sional educators and laypersons at the initiative of Maryland's Project
Basic staff. Grouped and identified with each of the five human activity
areas, the competencies expressed as "behaviors" were then winnowed
down to 321 "possible prerequisites for graduation" and distributed in
early 1978 to a stratified sample of over 22,000 Maryland residents for con-
(1969). As the Tinker Court stated, first amendment rights of students are to be "applied in
light of the special characteristics of the school environment." 393 U.S. at 506.
14. Id at 506.
15. 1d at 511.
16. In Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 99 S. Ct. 693 (1979), the Supreme
Court held that a public school teacher has a first amendment right to criticize school district
practices in private conversations with the school principal. If the private expression of a
public employee is protected by the first amendment, then the private expression of student
views on examinations should arguably receive similar first amendment protection.
17. MARYLAND STATE DEP'T OF EDUCATION, THE MISSION OF SCHOOLING (1977).
18. MARYLAND STATE DEP'T OF EDUCATION, PROJECT BASIC (1977).
19. Id
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sensual validation. Numerous items on the draft list probed the highly
sensitive areas of feeling and opinion, although none of these items may
survive the next stages in the development of the state's competency tests.
In late July of 1978, the Maryland State Board of Education approved a
"Declared Competency Index" 20 rejecting the "world of leisure," one of
the five areas previously projected in the Maryland plan establishing com-
petency-based prerequisites for graduation. 21 Although many of the
value-loaded items on the draft list distributed for public validation have
or may be discarded,22 they nonetheless serve as useful illustrations of the
kinds of competencies which, if transformed into mandatory test questions,
may raise first and fourteenth amendment challenges.
Among the "possible requirements for graduation" listed on response
forms distributed by Project Basic for consensual validation are the follow-
ing: "justify decisions made about leisure" 23; "define personal qualities
needed for work success (loyalty, responsibility, dependability)"; "describe
the limitations of government"; "translate into action feelings and
20. MD. BD. OF EDUC. RES. 39 (July 26, 1978). The State Board, whose nine members
are chosen by the governor, is responsible for making educational policy for the state. The
State Department of Education is designated as the administrative state-level agency. MD.
EDUC. CODE ANN. § 2-101 (Supp. 1978).
21. Although the State Board deleted "the world of leisure" from Maryland's compe-
tency-based prerequisites for graduation because it did not survive the public validation
process, the State Department of Education is continuing to work on a leisure curriculum.
Unlike the four approved areas, the purpose of the leisure curriculum is not to evaluate the
quality of student participation or to test for attitudes or for factual knowledge or concepts.
The purpose is merely to ensure that all students are exposed to some area of sports or the
arts. Telephone interviews with Dr. Richard Petre, Director of Project Basic (Dec. 15, 1978
and March 1, 1979). According to Dr. Petre, Project Basic is working on the development of
"behavioral indicators" designed to correspond to the declared competencies and eventually
to be translated into instructional objectives. An elaborate process of assessment and review
is also projected before the completion of the first draft of "assessment packets" targeted for
September, 1979. This process includes, among other things, pilot testing in three Maryland
schools, consultation with the instruction personnel involved in the pilot tests, educational
assessment by an out of state consulting firm, studies by University of Maryland faculty of
the comparative cost and feasibility of performance task versus pencil-and-paper measures
of competencies, and a legal review of the behavioral indicators and assessment tasks. Id It
was apparent in speaking with Dr. Petre that Maryland is proceeding with great caution and
with an eye open to legal ramifications. Provisions are being made for the exemption of the
most handicapped of the special education students and special testing modes are contem-
plated for other kinds of handicapped children. Id.
22. For recent publications explaining the Maryland Plan and its procedures, see
MARYLAND STATE DEP'T OF EDUCATION, THE COMPREHENSIVE PLAN FOR MARYLAND
COMPETENCY BASED PREREQUISITES FOR GRADUATION (1978) and MARYLAND STATE
DEP'T OF EDUCATION, MARYLAND'S PROJECT BASIC: COMPETENCY GENERATION PROCE-
DURES (1978).
23. Maryland Dep't of Educ., Project Basic Response Form, No. 006-04 PG 8, Re-
sponse No. 8. (Nov. 1977).
1979]
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thoughts about the arts"; 24 "identify results of exercising individual
rights"; "recognize ways to manage stress in one's life."' 25 A list of possible
competencies distributed to school guidance personnel contains the follow-
ing items: "demonstrates appropriate heterosexual behavior"; "resolves
conflicts with family"; "recognizes consequences of one's sexual behavior";
and "controls undesirable impulses."' 26 One may ask how educators can
assess student responses on questions derived from "competencies" of this
description without penalizing expressions of opinion.
Suppose, for example, that students were asked to define personal quali-
ties needed for work success and that loyalty, responsibility and dependa-
bility were the only answers to be marked correct. A student might
respond with equal legitimacy that one must possess the ability to protest
unfair working conditions or employer policies, or have the courage to
confront situations in which conscience would require resignation under
protest. Suppose further that under the heading of the rights and responsi-
bilities of parenthood, expression of student attitudes toward contracep-
tion, premarital sex, homosexuality, or the choice of parenthood itself were
subject to grading, not for the literary proficiency or analytical skill dis-
played by the responses, but for the state-determined appropriateness of
the values expressed. Only an ideologically committed testing authority
would venture to designate correct answers to questions of this character.
A challenge based on Tinker presupposes that the student has answered
freely and has received a lowered score as a result. Alternative challenges
to mandatory, value-oriented test questions might contest the validity of
compelling students to express opinions that are considered appropriate by
fiat of the testing authority but conflict with personal convictions of the
student. To object conscientiously to the authority of the state to com-
mand these responses is to challenge not the grading of particular answers,
but rather the authority of the state to require that expression be subject to
any grading at all.
This second type of first amendment claim finds its strongest support in
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette. 27 In the middle of
World War Two, the Supreme Court held that a compulsory flag salute
violated the first and fourteenth amendment rights of high school students
who were Jehovah's Witnesses. The Court included their right to remain
silent-to refuse to profess a patriotic allegiance that violated their per-
24. Id at No. 006-04 PG 13, Response Nos. 1, 13 and 18.
25. Id at No. 006-04 PG 14, Reponse Nos. 15 and 22.
26. The last four items are contained on a mimeographed list distributed by Project
Basic.
27. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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sonal convictions-within their constitutionally protected right of freedom
of expression. While the students were motivated by the religious belief
that Exodus prohibited them from saluting the flag because it was a
"graven image,"' 28 the Court upheld their claim on grounds of the first
amendment's protection of expression in general, rather than on the more
narrow ground of freedom of religious expression. 29
In scrutinizing West Virginia's power to command an involuntary affir-
mation of belief, the Barnette Court suggested a stricter constitutional
standard than that governing suppression of the expression of opinion. 30
"It would seem," the Court reasoned, "that involuntary affirmation could
be commanded only on even more immediate and urgent grounds than
silence."' 31 Because the mandatory flag salute ceremony was at best self-
defeating in accomplishing its goal of national unity, the Court held it did
not remotely demonstrate the requisite immediacy or urgency.32
Barnette is particulary significant because it portended a change in the
Court's attitude towards imposing the substantive limitations of the first
amendment on the action of state educational authorities. Only three years
earlier, in Minersville School District v. Gobitis, the Court, speaking
through Justice Frankfurter, upheld a compulsory flag salute required by
the local board of education on the theory that the Court should defer to
the judgment of elected political majorities, and further, that courts lacked
competence to adjudicate disputes over educational policy.33 The Barnette
28. Id. at 629.
29. The Court noted that "[w]hile religion supplies appellees' motive for enduring the
discomforts of making the issue in this case, many citizens who do not share these religious
views hold such a compulsory rite [the flag salute] to infringe constitutional liberty of the
individual." Id at 634-35. The Court did not reach the question of whether nonconformist
beliefs may furnish an exemption from a requirement to salute, since it found that the first
amendment precluded the state from even creating such a requirement. Id at 641.
30. The Barnette Court expressed the first amendment standard governing suppression
of expression in terms of the clear and present danger test, id at 639, a formulation that has
been supplanted by the "imminent lawless action" test. See note 13 supra. Barnette, unlike
Tinker, did not attempt to articulate a standard for the school environment different from
that for other public forums.
31. 319 U.S. at 633. In Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977), the Supreme Court,
relying extensively on Barnette, reformulated the standard governing a state's attempt to
force unwilling'individuals to disseminate ideological mottos: the state must demonstrate a
compelling countervailing interest that could not be achieved by a less drastic alternative
means. Id at 716. At issue in Wooley was New Hampshire's requirement that individuals
use their cars as "mobile billboards" for display of the motto "Live Free or Die" that is
embossed on the state's license plates. The Court recognized that the "right to speak and the
right to refrain from speaking are complementary components of the broader concept of
'individual freedom of mind."' Id at 714.
32. 319 U.S. at 640-41.
33. 310 U.S. 586, 597-98 (1940). The Court stated that "[t]o stigmatize legislative judg-
19791
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opinion, in contrast, resolutely affirmed the Court's responsibility for ap-
plying the Bill of Rights to the field of education. Although the Court
volunteered a pedagogical judgment about the "ultimate futility"34 of co-
ercing expressions of belief, the Barnette holding did not rely on an affir-
mation of superior judicial competence to evaluate the educational merits
of coercing expression. 35 Rather, the holding was based on the view that
coerced expression of patriotic values, whether or not an exercise in peda-
gogical futility, normally lies beyond the constitutional competence of the
educators. 36 In setting constitutional limits on what public educational
authorities may do in the name of pedagogy, the Court advanced some of
its most striking libertarian rhetoric: "If there is any fixed star on our con-
stitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe
what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters
of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein. '37
No other Supreme Court case dealing with state prescribed educational
activities matches Barnette's strong stance against the state's authority to
coerce a demonstration of belief against the personal convictions of recal-
citrant students.38 But while Barnette stands in isolation, it has prompted
ment. . . would amount to no less than the pronouncement of pedagogical and psychologi-
cal dogma in a field where courts possess no marked and certainly no controlling
competence." Id at 597-98. It further noted that "the courtroom is not the arena for debat-
ing issues of educational policy." Id. at 598.
34. 319 U.S. at 641.
35. The Court explained: "But we act in these matters not by authority of our compe-
tence but by force of our commissions." Id at 640.
36. Id. at 642.
37. Id.
38. In two earlier parental rights cases, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) and
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1924),. the Court held that unreasonable interfer-
ences with "the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of
children under their control" exceeded the state's authority. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. at 534-35. Neither case, however, involved a challenge to the authority of state school
officials to coerce the declaration of belief. Rather, both cases dealt with the conflict be-
tween the liberty of parents to seek private education for their children and the asserted
authority of the state to require or ban specific activity. Compare Meyer, 262 U.S. 390 (state
proscription against offering foreign language in private schools) with Pierce, 268 U.S. 510
(compelling attendance exclusively at public schools). See also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205, 213-14 (1972). See generally Goldstein, The Asserted Constitutional Right o/Public
School Teachers to Determine What They Teach, 124 U. PA. L. REV., 1293, 1305-16 (1976).
Supreme Court cases after Barnette have involved first amendment challenges to the consti-
tutional validity of particular curricular offerings either mandated or prohibited for the pub-
lic schools, but not to the state's power to coerce the expression of belief. Such challenges
have jointly invoked the free exercise and establishment clauses rather than the free expres-
sion guarantees contained in the first amendment. These establishment clause/free exercise
hybrids have successfully attacked required Bible reading, (School Dist. of Abington Town-
ship v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963)), official prayers (Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962)),
[Vol. 28:469
Constitutional Challenges of "Everystudent"
a variety of victorious constitutional challenges to mandated forms of ex-
pression both within39 and without4° the field of education.
released time for in-school religious exercises (McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203
(1948)), and a biology curriculum putatively motivated by fundamentalist religious interests
(Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968)). From a remedial point of view, these cases
sweep further than Barnette because in finding violations of the establishment clause, the
Court has not only exempted the complaining parties but has also invalidated the activities.
It should further be noted that in Epperson, the Court invalidated the biology curriculum at
issue by basing its holding on the "narrower grounds" of the free exercise and establishment
clauses rather than on the free expression clause. 393 U.S. at 106.
39. See, e.g., Lipp v. Morris, 579 F.2d 834 (3rd Cir. 1978) (Barnette's prohibition on
compelled participation in flag salute ceremony protects right not to be forced to stand at
attention during ceremony); Goetz v. Ansell, 477 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1973) (school child can-
not be compelled to stand or leave the classroom during the pledge of allegiance); Russo v.
Central School Dist., 469 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 932 (1973) (teacher's
first amendment rights violated when discharged for standing at silent attention during reci-
tation of pledge in violation of school regulation requiring participation); Frain v. Baron,
307 F. Supp. 27 (E.D.N.Y. 1969) (reliance on Tinker and Barnette to uphold student right to
refuse to stand or to leave classroom during flag salute ceremony).
A broad reading of Barnette has been most clearly articulated by the Maryland Court of
Appeals in State v. Lundquist, 262 Md. 534, 278 A.2d 263 (1971), in which it emphasized
Barnette's comprehensive free expression rationale. The Maryland Court of Appeals noted
that the joint concurring opinion of Justices Black and Douglas in Barnette expressed sub-
stantial agreement with Justice Jackson's opinion, while, at the same time, separately em-
phasized the religious liberty theme at issue. 262 Md. at 551, 278 A.2d at 272 (citing 319
U.S. at 643-44). The Maryland Court of Appeals treated the Black-Douglas "religious lib-
erty note," as supplementary to, rather than as a rejection of, the free expression rationale.
Id Also noting Tinker's reliance on Barnette, the Maryland court concluded that "Barnette
was unequivocally decided as a question of free speech .. " 262 Md. at 552, 278 A.2d at
273. Thus, the court invalidated the Maryland statute requiring all teachers and students,
except those objecting for religious reasons, to salute and pledge allegiance to the flag. The
court apparently accepted the teacher-plaintiffs objection to the mandatory flag salute cere-
mony not only because it violated his right of free expression, but also because it violated his
conscientious objection to forcing patriotism on his classes. See 262 Md. at 539, 278 A.2d at
266. Though Mr. Lundquist did not clearly base his challenge on a particular constitutional
provision, he presumably viewed his right to refrain from compelling others to salute the
flag as derived from the first amendment's prohibition on the compulsory flag salute. See
Statement by August Lundquist, 262 Md. at 555-56 (app.), 278 A.2d at 274-75 (app.). App-
lying Lundquist to the area of values testing, arguably teachers and school administrators
have standing to challenge a state requirement to administer test questions forcing students
to profess opinions in which they do not believe. Mr. Lundquist, who willingly taught patri-
otic and democratic ideas in his history classes, impliedly drew the important distinction
between persuasive, value-oriented teaching and the coerced expression of beliefs. See text
accompanying notes 49-51 infra.
40. See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 716 (1977) (New Hampshire cannot
compel display of ideological motto, "Live Free or Die," on state's license plates)(see note
31 supra); Cobb v. Beame, 402 F. Supp. 19, 26 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (city ordinance requiring
display of American flag at public assemblies and parades unconstitutionally infringes on
rights of free speech and assembly). See also Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, 401 U.S. I (1971)
(attorney may not be refused admission to bar for failing to answer whether she belonged to
an organization advocating violent overthrow of the government.) In Justice Stewart's con-
1979]
Catholic University Law Review
If state and local educational authorities may not 'condition access to
public education' 4' on such a visible and symbolic statement of belief as
the flag salute, may they condition exit from public high school with a
conventional diploma-the ticket of entry to most employment and further
educational opportunities-upon response to questions that probe atti-
tudes and beliefs? By recognizing only one correct answer to a test ques-
tion, would the school system not then be prescribing orthodoxies in
opinion? If a high school student anticipates and therefore writes the "cor-
rect" answer, even if contrary to his personal beliefs, value-oriented gradu-
ation test requirements would arguably force him to confess by word or act
"what is not in his mind," 42 and might invite first amendment challenges
that less visable if pervasive classroom requirements have not.
To be sure, Barnette must be read subject to qualifying exceptions. The
Barnette Court itself anticipated the possibility of "circumstances which
permit an exception" 43 but it ventured no suggestions applicable to educa-
tional settings.44 Nevertheless, in certifying graduates as at least mini-
mally competent to practice a profession, professional schools do
prescribe, at least indirectly, certain orthodoxies in the domain of attitudes.
The practicums and clinical components of training for a variety of service
professions, e.g., medicine, nursing, teaching, law, social work, personnel,
and student counseling, often entail evaluations of student-trainee atti-
tudes toward work and clients, at least as they are manifested in behavior.
Insofar as assessments of students are related to criteria of professional
ethics, competence, and client relationships, first amendment questions
currence in Baird, he relied on Barnette for the proposition that the "First and Fourteenth
Amendments bar a State from acting against any person merely because of his beliefs." 401
U.S. at 10. Likewise, in Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U.S. 207 (1971)(per curiam) the
Court invalidated a portion of Florida's loyalty oath requiring all public employees to vow
that they did not believe in violent overthrow of the government. The brief opinion struck
down the oath on procedural due process grounds, and can be interpreted as a disavowal of
the "State's decision to regard unwillingness to take the oath as conclusive, irrebuttable
proof of the proscribed belief." Id at 209 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justices Marshall,
Douglas and Brennan, however, found the required oath unconstitutional solely on the prin-
ciples enumerated in Barnette, noting that "state action injurious to an individual cannot bejustified on account of the nature of the individual's beliefs, whether he 'believe[s] in the
overthrow' or has any other sort of belief." Id (Marshall, J., concurring) (quoting West Va.
State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)). Also relying on Barnette, Justice
Stewart in a separate opinion stated: "[l]f the clause embraces the [plaintiffs] philosophical
or political beliefs, I think it is constitutionally infirm." Id at 210 (Stewart, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
41. See West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 630.
42. Id. at 634.
43. Id at 642.
44. The Court did, however, suggest an exception for persons subject to military disci-
pline who may not claim many of the inviolable freedoms of civilian life. Id at 642 n.19.
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have not arisen and are not likely to do so.4 5 Students attending profes-
sional schools do so as a matter of personal choice, with adequate notice
that norms of the profession exist. Students matriculating through primary
and secondary schools, on the other hand, are subject to the states' com-
pulsory education laws, a factor which the Barnette decision emphasized. 46
Their competency to enter adult life, as measured by the feelings, attitudes,
or beliefs they possess on matters of politics, use of leisure time, interper-
sonal relationships, parenting, or the arts should be a function of each in-
dividual's maturing self-definition, not the function of a score on a test. It
is one thing to certify that a student has demonstrated a capacity to read,
write, and calculate at some defined level. It is quite another matter for the
Testing Caesar to certify competence on matters of personal opinion. The
"freedom to be intellectually and spiritually diverse or even contrary," 47 is
a freedom that Barnette placed "beyond the reach of majorities and offi-
cials" 48 and, by logical extension, beyond consensual validation.
In holding the compulsory flag salute unconstitutional, the Barnette
Court noted that state efforts to foster certain values "by persuasion and
example" were not at issue in the case.49 Yet the Court commended this
"slow and easily neglected route."' 50 It is only when the state has at-
tempted to foster religious beliefs, breaching the first amendment's prohi-
bition on the establishment of religion, that the Supreme Court has
invalidated attempts by public educational authorities to inculcate particu-
lar values through persuasion and example.5' Thus, the right of public
educational institutions to engage in tutelage in values, short of offending
the establishment clause, appears to be beyond constitutional challenge.
Nevertheless, the courts have conceded a limited right to be exempted
from exposure to secular pedagogy. In its 1972 decision of Wisconsin v.
Yoder,52 the Supreme Court introduced a carefully circumscribed qualifi-
cation on the right of the state to compel exposure to exemplary and per-
suasive secular pedagogy.
45. See Board of Curators of the University of Missouri v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78
(1978); text accompanying notes 145-53 infra.
46. 319 U.S. at 632.
47. Id at 641.
48. Id at 638.
49. Id at 640.
50. Id at 631.
51. See cases cited in note 38 supra.
52. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). Unlike the free exercise/establishment clause cases cited in
note 38 supra, Yoder was the first education case in which the Supreme Court addressed a
free exercise claim apart from an establishment clause claim. The Amish objected, in the
name of religious freedom, to the secular orientation characterizing the culture and curricu-
lum of secondary schools.
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A parental rights and free exercise hybrid, Yoder focused on the coer-
cive elements inherent in the legally mandated exposure of children to val-
ues objectionable to the complaining parents. Members of the Old Amish
Order alleged that Wisconsin's compulsory school attendance law forcibly
exposed their children to the secular values of modern secondary schools
in violation of both the rights protected under the free exercise clause of
the first amendment and the traditional interest of parents in the religious
upbringing of their children. 53 The Supreme Court agreed. The issue was
not, as it had been in Barnette, the direct compulsion of belief, but rather
the indirect but potent destroyer of distinctive cultures--contemporary so-
ciety's "hydraulic insistence on conformity to majoritarian standards." 54
In this unique case, the Court acknowledged the cultural relativism inher-
ent in the abstract notion of adult competence, at least beyond the "basic
skills" in "reading, writing and elementary math." 55 Education in formal
secondary schools, with its emphasis on competitiveness, on intellectual,
technological, and scientific achievement, and on worldly success and so-
cial life with worldly peers would ill-prepare the Amish child for compe-
tent adulthood in the separatist, Amish church community. 56
Consequently, the Court granted the Amish the extraordinary relief of ab-
solute exemption from exposure to secular, secondary schooling.57 Yoder's
bow to cultural relativism is carefully qualified, however, not only by its
linkage to the free exercise clause of the first amendment, but also by its
insistence on the unique characteristics of the centuries-tested, separatist
Amish religious culture. Nevertheless, by setting some limits upon state-
compelled exposure to secular curricula, Yoder implicitly acknowledged
the legitimately diverse ways to function as a competent adult in our com-
plex, differentiated society.58 Yoder has also led to a number of successful
53. See id at 209. The Amish did not raise objections to formal education through the
eighth grade "because they agree[d] that their children must have basic skills in the 'three
R's ... ' 406 U.S. at 212.
54. Id at 217.
55. Id at 211-12.
56. Id at 211-13.
57. Justice Douglas dissented from Yoder in part because the majority gave preference
to religious over secular conscience. 406 U.S. at 247 (Douglas, J., dissenting). He also dis-
sented because the majority assumed an identity of interest between parents and children.
Id at 243-46.
58. One commentator has interpreted the Yoder-Pierce-Barnette theory as a source of
broad first amendment protections based upon the "preservation of individual consciousness
from government coercion." Arons, The Separation of School and State, 46 HARV. EDUC.
REV. 76, 96 (1976). Under this view, the principle of religious neutrality analogously insu-
lates an individual from government sanction with regard to beliefs about basic contempo-
rary issues of conscience. Id at 99. Such an interpretation of freedom of religion
protections would limit the state's power to coerce the expression of belief.
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religiously grounded claims for selective exemption from particular public
school curriculum requirements, primarily in the area of sex education. 59
Logically and practically, exemptions granted to free exercise claimants
from exposure to objectionable curricula and related testing would under-
mine the authority to test any student in these areas. To carve out excep-
tions to mandatory, value-oriented tests purporting to establish a uniform
minimum measure of adult competence contradicts the reason for their
existence.
B. Privacy Questions
Most Supreme Court decisions dealing with governmental inquiry into
individual beliefs and associational ties are based on the first amendment's
protection of speech and freedom of association. 60 Value testing of a par-
ticularly intrusive nature might also be vulnerable to attack as an invasion
of the constitutionally protected right of privacy.
The Supreme Court's explicit recognition of a constitutional right to pri-
vacy is of fairly recent vintage.61 While early decisions found a zone of
privacy within the penumbra cast by the Bill of Rights,62 the Court has
since identified the source of the privacy right as the concept of personal
liberty protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.63
59. See Citizens for Parental Rights v. San Mateo County Bd. of Educ., 51 Cal. App. 3d
1, 124 Cal. Rptr. 68 (1975), cert. dismissed, 425 U.S. 908, rehearing denied, 425 U.S. 1000
(1976); Hopkins v. Hamden Bd. of Educ., 29 Conn. Supp. 397, 289 A.2d 914 (1971);
Holboth v. Greenway, 52 Mich. App. 682, 218 N.W.2d 98 (1974); Valent v. New Jersey State
Bd. of Educ., 118 N.J. Super. 416, 288 A.2d 52 (1972). But see Cornwell v. State Bd. of
Educ., 314 F. Supp. 340, 344 (D. Md. 1969), afd, 428 F.2d 471 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 942 (1970). All of these cases involved objections to courses in sex education.
While the courts were uniformly unsympathetic to the parental request that the courses be
discontinued, all but the Maryland decision supported the right of the parents to request an
exemption for their children on religious grounds. Under bylaws adopted by the Maryland
State Board of Education, pupils could be excused, upon written request of parents or
guardians, from certain instructional programs dealing with physiological and personality
changes related to maturation and human reproduction. Maryland State Bd. of Educ. By-
law 720:1 (1970). See also Spence v. Bailey, 465 F.2d 797 (6th Cir. 1972) (required partici-
pation in ROTC program as a condition of receiving a high school diploma transgressed
student's free exercise of religious beliefs).
60. See, e.g., Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U.S. 207 (1971); Baird v. State Bar of Ari-
zona, 401 U.S. 1 (1971); Gibson v. Florida Legislation Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539
(1963); Torasco v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960);
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
61. The first Supreme Court decision to acknowledge an individual's constitutional
right of privacy was Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (law forbidding use of
contraceptives by married couple invades constitutionally protected zone of privacy).
62. Id at 484-85.
63. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). Seealso Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-
99 n.23 (1977). Commentators hailed the Court's action as a revival of the doctrine of
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Gradually, the Court has expanded the right of privacy to encompass those
personal activities deemed "fundamental." 64
In its 1977 decision in Whalen v. Roe,65 the Court identified two kinds of
interests protected by the constitutional concept of privacy: "the individ-
ual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters," 66 and the interest
in making fundamentally important decisions without governmental intru-
sion.67 These "important decisions," summarized by the Court as those
"relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships,
child rearing, and education," 68 may justify "limitations on the States'
power to substantively regulate conduct. '69
No Supreme Court case has specifically considered the boundaries of a
student's constitutionally protected right of privacy.70 Within the frame-
work of the "important decision" interest articulated in Whalen, the Court
has, however, expressly recognized that minors have a constitutional right
of privacy. At the same time the Court has also indicated that the privacy
right of minors is more circumscribed than that of adults. In 1976, in
Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth,7' the Court invali-
dated a blanket statutory requirement which provided that unmarried mi-
nors must obtain parental consent in order to obtain an abortion. 72
substantive due process. See, e.g., Note, The Minor's Right of Privacy. Limitations on State
Action After Danforth and Carey, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1216, 1218 n.16 (1977); Note, Carey,
Kids and Contraceptives." Privacy's Problem Child, 32 U. MIAMI L. REV. 750, 753 n.15 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Privacy's Problem Child). See generally Perry, Substantive Due Process
Revisited- Reflections on (and Beyond) Recent Cases, 71 Nw. U.L. REV. 417, 420-21 (1976)
(right of privacy is actually a facade for direct application of substantive due process) [here-
inafter cited as Perry].
64. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973) (women's decision to terminate preg-
nancy); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (unmarried person's right to use contra-
ceptives); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (use of contraceptives by
married persons).
65. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
66. Id at 599.
67. Id at 599-600.
68. Id at 600 n.26 (quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976)). See also Moore v.
East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (articulating the principle of freedom of personal
choice in matters of marriage and family life as one of the liberties meriting protection under
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.)
69. 429 U.S. at 600 n.26.
70. Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973), though initiated as an invasion of privacy
case by parents of District of Columbia school children, focused exclusively on issues of
congressional immunity and official immunity within the legislative context.
71. 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976).
72. Whether other restrictions which are not "blanket restrictions" will be upheld is
currently under consideration. The Court stressed that its invalidation of the statute "does
not suggest that every minor, regardless of age or maturity, may give effective consent" for
abortion. 428 U.S. at 75. Rather, the statute was impermissible because it required parental
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Although it upheld the minor's privacy claim in Danforth, the Court also
underscored the state's "somewhat broader authority to regulate the activi-
ties of children than adults." 73
One year later in Carey v. Population Services International,74 the Court
again considered the degree of constitutional protection afforded to mi-
nors' privacy rights. In so doing, the plurality opinion-accompanied by
numerous separate opinions-highlighted the difficulty of defining the
right and failed to muster sufficient suport to set forth a clear standard of
review. Striking down a New York law which, among other things, pro-
hibited minors from having access to contraceptives, 75 a plurality of four
Justices announced that "the right to privacy in connection with decisions
affecting procreation extends to minors as well as adults."'76 The plurality
recognized the right as fundamental. 77 Nonetheless, rather than requiring
the state to demonstrate a compelling state interest furthered by the stat-
ute, as it had when considering an adult's fundamental right to privacy,78
the plurality invoked Danforth's "significant state interest" requirement as
consent, "exercisable by a person other than the woman and her physician, as a prerequi-
site" to a minor's abortion and "does so without a sufficient justification for the restriction."
Id Presently, the Court is considering the constitutionality of a Massachusetts statute re-
quiring minors who fail to obtain parental consent for an abortion to secure judicial ap-
proval. See Baird v. Bellotti, 450 F. Supp. 997 (D. Mass.), prob. juris noted, 99 S. Ct. 307
(1978).
73. Id at 74-75. The Court based its decision, in part, on the principle that
"[c]onstitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only when one attains
the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitu-
tion and possess constitutional rights." Id at 74. For one critical commentary on the
Court's approach, see Hafen, Puberty, Privacy and Protection.- The Risks of Children's
"Rights", 63 A.B.A.J. 1383 (1977).
74. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
75. Under N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6811(8) (McKinney 1972), it was a crime:
(1) for any person to sell or distribute any contraceptive of any kind to a minor
under the age of 16 years; (2) for anyone other than a licensed pharmacist to dis-
tribute contraceptives to persons 16 or older.
431 U.S. at 681. An exception was provided which allowed physicians to dispense contra-
ceptives to patients of any age if he deemed it "proper in connection with his practice." Id
§ 6807(b). The statute also prohibited the advertising and displaying of contraceptives, id, a
prohibition that the Court unanimously found to violate the first amendment. 431 U.S. at
700-02.
76. Id at 693. The plurality consisted of Justices Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, and
Blackmun.
77. Id at 696 n.22.
78. See id at 686. Thus, if the state action concerns either a suspect classification such
as race or a fundamental right such as voting or privacy, then the state must demonstrate a
compelling interest for its action. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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the appropriate standard governing the review of state action that infringes
upon the privacy rights of minors.79 This lesser standard was justified on
the basis of the state's traditionally greater interest in regulating the activi-
ties of minors and on the common law presumption that minors possess a
"lesser capability for making important decisions."80 The remaining Jus-
tices, filing separate opinions, disagreed over the scope of the minors' right
and would have imposed an even less rigorous standard of review. 81 Thus
a clear majority of Justices would subject invasions of privacy of minors to
a less rigorous review than the "compelling state interest" test applied to
similar invasions of the privacy rights of adults.
8 2
While the two types of protected privacy rights enunciated in Whalen
would presumably apply to minor students, an infringement of their rights
would undoubtedly be justified by a less important state interest than
would be required for adults. What state interest would suffice in a partic-
79. The Court stated that "state restrictions inhibiting privacy rights of minors are valid
only if they serve 'any significant state interest ...that is not present in the case of an
adult."' Id at 693 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S.
at 75).
80. Id at 693 n. 15.
81. Justice Powell agreed with the outcome but asserted that the validity of state laws
restricting the freedom of minors in sexual matters should be controlled by whether the
restriction rationally served valid state interests, not by a "significant state interest" stan-
dard. Id at 704-05 (Powell, J., concurring in part). Moreover, he argued that the "signifi-
cant state interest" standard was equivalent to the compelling state interest standard for all
practical purposes. Id at 706.
Justice Stevens flatly rejected as "frivolous" the argument that a minor has the constitu-
tional right to use contraceptives in spite of the objection of parents and state. Id at 713
(Stevens, J., concurring in part). He agreed that the law in question was invalid, however,
because of the unfairness of subjecting minors to a "greater risk of irreparable harm [vene-
real desease and premarital pregnancy] than adults." Id at 714.
Justice White agreed with Justice Stevens that minors had no constitutional right to use
contraceptives. Id at 702-03 (White, J., concurring in part). He concurred with the judg-
ment, however, "primarily because the State has not demonstrated that the prohibition...
measurably contributes to the deterrent purposes which the State advances as justification
for the restriction." Id at 702-03. Justice Rehnquist, dissenting, argued that the state
should be able to use its "police power to legislate in the interests of its concept of the public
morality as it pertains to minors." Id at 719 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Burger also
dissented but filed no opinion.
82. This may indicate that the Court has not fully determined whether minors should
be afforded only qualified fundamental rights or full scale fundamental rights subject to a
diluted compelling interest standard. See Privacy's Problem Child, supra note 63, at 756
n.32. In Carey, Justice Brennan characterized the question of the state's authority to regu-
late minors in areas in which it cannot regulate adults as a "vexing" one for which there may
be no precise answer. 431 U.S. at 692. One commentator has suggested that a uniform
compelling state interest test should be applied to any state action affecting fundamental
rights. The state may, however, possess additional compelling interests when regulating the
activities of minors. See Note, The Minor's Right of Privacy. Limitations on State Action
after Danforth and Carey, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1216, 1232 n.88 (1977).
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ular case is unclear, however, in view of the current Court's lack of cohe-
sion on this issue.
Both Danforth and Carey were concerned only with the second type of
interest specified in Whalen-the interest in making important decisions
regarding such matters as procreation and contraception-rather than the
"interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters."'83 If competency test-
ing were to include questions or behavioral assessments that probe atti-
tudes toward marriage and parenting, procreation or contraception, the
school system would not directly intrude upon the decisions students have
made, or may make, in their private lives beyond the schoolhouse gate.84
Thus, a privacy challenge would more likely rest on the student's interest
in avoiding disclosure of personal information.
While the interest in avoiding such disclosure may be protected by the
constitutional right of privacy, that interest is not absolute. Governmental
compulsion to disclose personal information is a commonplace exercise of
a state's police powers. Whalen v. Roe, for example, upheld a provision of
New York's Controlled Substances Act of 1972, which required that the
83. 429 U.S. at 599-600.
84. Examples of school regulations that arguably do directly intrude upon students' per-
sonal decisions are school dress codes and hair regulations. The Supreme Court has de-
clined, however, to review lower court cases that have addressed, with conflicting
conclusions, the constitutionality of these regulations. Compare, e.g., Holsapple v. Woods,
500 F.2d 49 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 901 (1974) and Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d
1281 (1st Cir. 1970) (right to wear hair in desired length or manner is an ingredient of per-
sonal freedom or liberty protected by the constitution) with Karr v. Schmidt, 460 F.2d 609
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 989 (1972); King v. Saddleback Junior College Dist., 445
F.2d 932 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 979 (1971); and Jackson v. Dorrier, 424 F.2d 213
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970) (hair length regulations do not violate first
amendment, right to privacy, due process or equal protection).
Although these cases were decided prior to Carey and Danforth, the standards enunciated
in them are of interest, particularly because of their wide variation. The Seventh Circuit
held that the right to wear hair as the student pleases is a fundamental right and therefore
the state has a "substantial burden ofjustification," including the showing that the regula-
tion furthers an important state interest and is no greater than is essential to further that
interest. Holsapple v. Woods, 500 F.2d at 52 (citing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367,
377 (1968)). Although the First Circuit does not view choice of hair length as "so fundamen-
tal as to require a compelling state interest," it nonetheless views it as within the sphere of a
personal liberty, therefore requiring that the state show an "outweighing state interest justi-
fying the intrusion." Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d at 1284-85. The Fifth, Sixth and Ninth
Circuits, however, have concluded that a student's hair length choice is not a constitutionally
protected right, in part because of the strong policy of allowing schools wide discretion in
making decisions that theoretically may impinge on a student's liberty. Thus, the appropri-
ate standard of judicial review in those circuits is much more deferential to the state. See,
e.g., Karr v. Schmidt, 460 F.2d at 615-16 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 989 (1972) (citing
Williams v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955) (appropriate standard is
whether the regulation is reasonably intended to accomplish a constitutionally permissible
state objective).
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names and addresses of persons obtaining certain drugs, pursuant to a doc-
tor's prescription, be recorded in a centralized computer file.85 Unani-
mously rejecting the claim that this requirement constituted an
unconstitutional invasion of privacy, the Court balanced the "[sitate's vital
interest in controlling the distribution of dangerous drugs" 86 against the
limited intrusion on personal privacy entailed by the patient-identification
provision. Since the statute contained several safeguards limiting access to
the information to personnel involved in the implementation of the pro-
gram and since there was no evidence that these safeguards were ineffec-
tive, the state had only to satisfy the Court that the identification
requirement was a reasonable, rather than a necessary, experimental
means of effectuating the goal of controlling drug abuse.87
"halen indicated that the right of privacy concerning disclosure of per-
sonal information, at least when a vital state interest is involved, is a func-
tion of the extent to which personal information becomes public.88 In light
of the more relaxed standard of constitutional review accorded minors,89 it
is unclear whether coercive disclosure of student views on matters of per-
sonal concern as a component part of competency testing would amount to
a constitutional violation in the absence of public disclosure. Moreover,
assuming school authorities respect recent statutory and administrative re-
straints on access to information,9" with some exceptions, student records
could not be disclosed to third parties without prior student and parental
85. N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW §§ 3356 to 3374 (McKinney Supp. 1976-77).
86. 429 U.S. at 598. While the Court in Whalen unequivocally stated that neither first
nor fourth amendment protections were involved, id. at 604 n.32, one commentator noted
that the Court nevertheless invoked the same standard used in fourth amendment case anal-
ysis. See Comment, Constitutional Law-Right of Privacy-Drug Abuse Control-Whalen P.
Roe, 24 N.Y.L.S.L.R. 260, 273 (1978).
87. 429 U.S. at 600-03. In a concurring opinion, however, Justice Brennan warned that
any statutory deprivation of the protected liberty interest in privacy, (i.e. broad dissemina-
tion of the information) would survive only if necessary to promote a compelling state inter-
est. 429 U.S. at 607 (Brennan, J., concurring).
88. Two members of the Court's majority disagreed over whether broad disclosure
would invade a constitutionally protected privacy right. Justice Stewart, in a concurring
opinion, took issue with Justice Brennan's view that broad dissemination by state officials of
such information would clearly implicate constitutionally protected privacy rights, justified
only by a compelling state interest. In contrast, he refused to acknowledge a "general inter-
est in freedom from disclosure of private information," pointing out that the Court had in
the past recognized a constitutionally protected privacy interest in avoiding disclosure only
when marriage, privacy in the home, and contraception were involved. Id at 608-09 (Stew-
art, J., concurring).
89. See notes 78-82 and accompanying text supra.
90. See, e.g., The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. §
1232g (1976) (commonly referred to as the "Buckley Amendment") and HEW Implement-
ing Guidelines, 45 C.F.R. §§ 99.1 to 99.67 (1977).
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consent. 9'
Assuming that test responses bearing on personal values are kept confi-
dential, the most feasible privacy challenge would be to attack the legiti-
macy of the state's right even to ask the questions. In this situation, the
student would argue that no vital state interest is involved or, that the
objectives of such questioning are constitutionally impermissible. Mer-
riken v. Cressman,92 the only case pertinent to privacy attacks on the ques-
tioning of students, does not directly address this issue. In Merriken, a
federal district court invalidated a nonmandatory questionnaire that asked
highly personal questions of junior high school children about their rela-
tionship with members of their family.93 In condemning the questionnaire
for invading the privacy of the relationship between parent and child, the
court found that disclosure and the resulting labeling of children under-
mined the legitimacy of the program's stated goal of drug prevention. 94
Hence, the court's willingness to prevent the state from asking questions
probing personal information may provide little precedential value to a
court examining such questions when disclosure is not at issue.
This factor, along with the absence of relevant cases, does not necessar-
ily mean that challenges to the constitutional validity of the questions
91. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(3) (1976). Furthermore, these records would not necessarily
reflect information that a student would not wish disclosed. Since the Family Privacy Act
guarantees student and parental access to the student's school records, id § 1232g(a)(1)(A),
one can envisage a student's or parent's addition of statements to the student's files, see id §
1232(a)(l)(C)(2), supplementing or contradicting the personal information acquired under a
compulsory testing program.
92. 364 F. Supp. 913 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
93. Each student was asked to answer whether his parents "hugged and kissed him
good-night when he was small," whether they told him "how much they loved him or her,"
whether the parents "seemed to know what the student's needs or wants are," and whether
the student "feels that he is loved by his parents." Id at 918. It also asked teachers and
students to identify "other students.., who make unusual or odd remarks, get into fights or
quarrels with other students, make unusual or inappropriate responses during normal school
activities, or have to be coaxed or forced to work with other pupils." Id at 916. Further-
more, the court noted, no standards defining "odd," "unusual," or "inappropriate" were
provided. Id
94. Unlike the program in Whalen, the questionnaire in Merriken contained no safe-
guards against indiscriminate public disclosure. Confidentiality in the use of the results was
precluded by a goal of the program-identification of potential drug abusers-in which the
questionnaire played a critical part. The court stressed the "insurmountable harm" that
could occur to a labeled child. Id at 920. Children identified by the results as potential
drug abusers were to be subject to remedial intervention at the hand of "teachers, guidance
counselors and others who [had] had little training in the area of psychological therapy."
Id. Labeling also carried the risk of creating a self-fulfilling prophecy. See id at 915. Such
damage to even one child was apparently sufficient to question the whole program. Id. at
920. Thus the Court struck the balance between the invasion of privacy and the public need
for a drug abuse program in favor of the child and parent. Id at 920-21.
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themselves will prove unsuccessful. Whalen did not go so far as to hold
that governmental compulsion to disclose personal matters is beyond con-
stitutional challenge. Rather, it held that compulsory disclosure is justified
when access is limited to personnel involved in the administration of a
constitutionally legitimate, vital governmental program. If the state's rea-
son for requiring disclosure of personal information is not of such a vital
nature, however, a lesser intrusion on privacy might be viewed as constitu-
tionally impermissible.
This kind of balancing is suggested in Judge Skelly Wright's dissent
from the disposition of the District of Columbia Circuit Court in Doe v.
McMillan.95 In addressing the privacy issue involved in the case-public
dissemination of derogatory information about named children in a con-
gressional report describing conditions in the District of Columbia
schools 96 -Judge Wright argued that the "compelled exposure" of stu-
dents' private affairs "in itself constitutes a severe intrusion" upon their
right to privacy, although it may be justified by "the state's overriding in-
terest in educating its citizens." 97
The question then becomes what overriding interest in the education of
its children would justify a state requirement that students reveal matters
of personal concern. The claim that the information is necessary to certify
the student as a competent adult is the rationale underlying competency
testing. Yet, Tinker and Barnette remain vital legal authority warning that
public school students "stand on [the] right of self-determination in mat-
ters that touch individual opinion and personal attitudes." 98 In addition,
Yoder's radical support of an unconventional lifestyle implies that the goal
of certifying a student as a competent adult on various dimensions of per-
sonality may be beyond the province of state educational authorities.
C Remediesfor First Amendment and Privacy Violations
If state or local educational authorities do introduce value-oriented test
questions that coerce or penalize student opinion on matters of personal
concern or that encroach upon privacy, it is important to examine the rem-
edies available to a student asserting a constitutional violation. A student
who refuses to respond to questions calling for disclosures of beliefs or
personal matters, or who is downgraded because of values expressed
would not be suspended from school as were the students in Tinker.99
95. 459 F.2d 1304, 1319-29 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Wright, J., dissenting).
96. Id at 1308.
97. Id at 1326.
98. 319 U.S. at 631.
99. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). See text accompanying notes 12-15 supra.
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Neither would he be subject to the more draconian sanction of expulsion,
with concurrent designation as a "delinquent" as were the students in Bar-
nette;1°° nor would his parents be subject to prosecution, as the Jehovah's
Witnesses were under the West Virginia law.' 0 ' Moreover, if the responses
are not widely disclosed, he would not suffer from the effects of labeling as
were the students identified as potential drug abusers in Merriken.10 2 The
student's test scores would be lowered, however, perhaps jeopardizing his
academic status. Whether the downgrading of answers or nonresponses to
constitutionally impermissible questions would result in the denial of a di-
ploma cannot be determined in the abstract. The answer would depend on
the particular grading scheme chosen by a given state or locality, and, pre-
sumably, on the student's overall responses to both constitutionally per-
missible as well as constitutionally impermissible questions. Thus, where
the harm in Tinker, Barnette, and Merriken unequivocally resulted from
the constitutional violations, the denial of a high school diploma may re-
sult from other reasons. Moreover, absent the unlawful disclosure of test
results, a student who either passed the exam in spite of the impermissible
questions, or would have failed the test anyway, regardless of those ques-
tions would suffer no concrete harm. Accordingly, it is doubtful that the
student in either of these two situations could successfully assert a claim
for significant money damages or for the granting of a diploma. Only the
student who failed the test solely as a result of impermissible questions
would have a clear chance of obtaining such relief.
Two recent Supreme Court decisions have addressed the question of re-
lief available to plaintiffs who are unable to establish a causal link between
a constitutional violation and a remediable injury. In the first, Mt. Healthy
City School District Board of Education v. Doyle,10 3 the Court considered a
claim for reinstatement and back pay by an untenured teacher whose con-
tract had not been renewed for both constitutionally permissible and im-
permissible reasons. 04
In dealing with the teacher's contention that the nonrenewal decision
had violated his first amendment rights, Justice Rehnquist, speaking for a
unanimous Court, applied "a test of causation which distinguishes be-
100. 319 U.S. at 629. See also text accompanying notes 27-32 supra.
101. Id
102. 364 F. Supp. at 920.
103. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
104. The teacher had been involved in several disruptive incidents at school such as ar-
guing with school employees and making obscene gestures to female students. He also had
notified a local radio station of the substance of a school memorandum concerning teacher
dress and appearance. All of these incidents played a part in the Board's decision not to
rehire him. See id at 281-83.
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tween a result caused by a constitutional violation and one not so
caused."' 1 5 Even if the teacher successfully meets the initial burden of
proving that his conduct was both constitutionally protected and a "sub-
stantial factor" in the decision to terminate his employment, 0 6 the school
board's action "would [not] necessarily amount to a constitutional viola-
tion justifying remedial action."' 1 7 Only if the employer subsequently
fails to show that the same decision would have been made in the absence
of the protected conduct would the plaintiff be entitled to reinstatement
and back pay. '0 8 In other words, the Mt. Healthy test allows the employer
to terminate an employee for cause even though the employee engages in
protected activity, if the employer proves, by a preponderance of the evi-
dence, 0 9 that constitutionally permissible reasons were sufficient grounds
for the decision." 0 In the Court's words, "the constitutional principle at
stake is sufficiently vindicated if such an employee is placed in no worse a
position than if he had not engaged in the conduct."' l
After Mount Healthy, it is uncertain whether a constitutional violation
can exist if the employer carries his burden of proof, or whether, given the
same circumstances, the constitutional violation will not justify the reme-
dies of reinstatement and back pay. Viewing the phrase "justifying reme-
dial action" as a restrictive clause modifying "constitutional violation"
supports the second interpretation.
Under either interpretation a student denied a high school diploma be-
cause of his failure to pass a competency test would first have to show that
his answers or refusals to answer were constitutionally protected and were
a substantial factor in the denial of the diploma." 12 The burden would
105. Id. at 286.
106. Id at 287.
107. Id at 285. The Court accepted the district court's finding that the conduct in ques-
tion was protected. Id at 284. It disagreed, however, with the district court's decision that if
protected conduct played a substantial part in the Board's decision, the plaintiff would nec-
essarily prevail. Id at 285.
108. Id. at 287.
109. Id. It thus remanded the case for the district court's determination of whether the
Board had shown that it would have reached the same employment decision even in the
absence of the protected conduct. Id at 287.
110. The Court noted that a "borderline or marginal candidate" should not lose his job
because of the constitutionally protected conduct. Id. at 286. It went on to state, however,
that such a candidate: "ought not to be able, by engaging in such conduct, to prevent his
employer from assessing his performance record and reaching a decision not to rehire on the
basis of that record, simply because the protected conduct makes the employer more certain
of the correctness of its decision." Id
I 11. Id. at 285-86.
112. How the Court defines the term "substantial" is not clear. If the student would not
have passed the exam on the basis of the permissible questions, it is difficult to see how the
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then shift to the school to prove the complaining student would have failed
the competency test anyway, regardless of the impermissible questions.
Should the state satisfy this burden, the student would not be entitled to a
judicially awarded diploma. 1 3
Mi. Healthy appears to indicate that a plaintiff failing to meet the pre-
scribed causation test would not be entitled to compensatory damages or to
a mandatory injunction. But a subsequent decision, Carey v. Pqvhus,l 4
may sanction nominal damages for those who fail to prove the factual in-
jury resulted from a proven constitutional violation. Piphus involved an
action for damages under the Civil Rights Act of 1871,115 brought by stu-
dents suspended from public school without due process. 1 6 While re-
jecting the students' claim for compensatory damages absent proof of
actual injury resulting from the constitutional violation, the Court never-
theless held that the students would be entitled to nominal damages. '17 In
answers to impermissible questions could be viewed as a "substantial factor" in the ultimate
denial of a diploma. Thus it would seem that these plaintiffs could not meet their burden of
proof.
113. Although the M. Healthy test was articulated in the context of an untenured
teacher's rights, it is also presumably the appropriate test for deciding students' first amend-
ment and privacy challenges to competency tests. On the same day the Court decided Mt.
Healthy, it applied the test to an equal protection challenge to a denial of a rezoning request.
See Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270 n.21 (1977). See also
DuRoss, Toward Rationality in Discriminatory Discharge Cases. the Impact of Mount Healthy
P. Doyle Upon the NLA, 66 GEO. L.J. 1109, 1121 n.66 (1978).
114. 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
115. The Civil Rights Act of 1871, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976), provides a private
right of action for individuals deprived of constitutional rights. The statute provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States, or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
For a fuller discussion of the purposes of § 1983, see 435 U.S. at 253-59.
116. In Piphus, no finding was made by the district court as to whether the students
would have been suspended had they been accorded prior due process hearings. 435 U.S. at
252. The Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeals that if the student's suspensions
were proved on remand to be warranted, an award of compensatory damages for the
school's violation of their due process rights would be a "windfall" rather than a compensa-
tion. 435 U.S. at 260. This part of P~phus supports the view that Mt. Healthy did not state
that no constitutional violation exists if, in the case of mixed-motive dismissals, the em-
ployer can justify the nonrenewal decision with constitutionally permissible reasons.
117. The plaintiffs in Carey v. Piphus argued that regardless of whether they proved that
actual damage flowed from the constitutional violation, such damage should be "presumed"
because the plaintiffs suffered mental and emotional distress resulting from the denial of a
"feeling of just treatment." 435 U.S. at 261. Although the Court recognized that such dis-
tress could be caused by the denial of procedural due process, it refused to go so far as to
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making the denial of procedural due process actionable for nominal dam-
ages, the Court recognized that when "absolute" constitutional rights" 8
have been infringed, no proof of actual injury need be demonstrated.' '9
Whether a cause of action for nominal damages would lie for a depriva-
tion of nonprocedural rights was not explicitly discussed in Piphus. Nor
did the Court define what rights, other than procedural ones, qualify as
"absolute." Yet, among the seven lower court cases cited by the Court in
support of its holding, 20 three expressed approval of nominal damages
when the deprivation of other rights had not been directly linked to actual
injury.12' Arguably the right to refuse to answer test questions, which ei-
ther encourage the parroting of orthodoxies or probe personal beliefs,
could be characterized as an absolute right, whether based on the first
amendment, which has been termed "the matrix, the indispensable condi-
tion of nearly every form of freedom"' 22 or on the right of privacy, now
recognized as a protected liberty interest under the fourteenth amend-
ment. 23 Assuming, therefore, that Carey v. Jiphus is not limited to depri-
vation of procedural rights, a student who successfully establishes that
such questions violate first amendment rights or the right to privacy
could-without proving actual injury' 24- recover nominal damages and
prohibitory injunctive relief forbidding further use of such questions on
assume that "every departure from procedural due process" would necessarily cause such
injury. Id at 263.
118. Id. at 266.
119. Id. The Court acknowledged the tradition followed by common law courts in vin-
dicating certain "absolute rights":
By making the deprivation of such rights actionable for nominal damages without
proof of actual injury, the law recognizes the importance to organized society that
those rights be scrupulously observed; but at the same time, it remains true to the
principle that substantial damages should be awarded only to compensate actual
injury, or ... to deter or punish malicious deprivations of rights.
Id The Court found that procedural due process was an "absolute right" in the sense that it
did not depend on the merits of the plaintiffs' substantive assertions, and because society has
such a strong interest in seeing that procedural due process rights are enforced. Id
120. Id at 266-67 n.24.
121. Magnett v. Pelletier, 488 F.2d 33, 35 (1st Cir. 1973) (unreasonable search by police
officer); Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74, 87-88 (3d Cir. 1965) (unreasonable arrest); Berry v.
Macon County Bd. of Educ., 380 F. Supp. 1244, 1248 (M.D. Ala. 1971) (right of board of
education employees to send their children to private segregated schools).
122. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937)(Cardozo, J.) Moreover, the Court in
Baird v. State Bar of Arizona stated that the "freedom to believe," unlike the "freedom to
act," is an absolute right. 401 U.S. 1, 5 (1971) (quoting CantweU v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296, 303-04 (1940)).
123. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). See notes 61-64 and accompanying text
supra.
124. The plaintiff might also try to prove emotional or mental distress resulting from
being forced to think about and respond to such sensitive questions.
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future tests. 125
Thus relief would be possible even if lowered test scores did not result in
the denial of a diploma or if mental and emotional distress could not be
proved. Unlike a judicially awarded diploma or compensatory damages,
such nominal damages and prohibitory injunctive relief would protect
against invasion of first amendment and privacy rights without conferring
an unearned "windfall" on the student.' 26 In Piphus, the Court also noted
that a defendant's potential liability for attorney's fees under the Civil
Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976,127 "provides additional-and
by no means inconsequential-assurance that agents of the State will not
deliberately ignore due process rights."1 28 Although this caveat is limited
to the discussion of procedural rights, the 1976 Act clearly does not restrict
discretionary awards of attorney's fees to prevailing parties in cases that
deal solely with procedural rights.' 29
II. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS CHALLENGES TO BASIC SKILLS AND
FUNCTIONAL LITERACY TESTING
In substantive due process challenges to basic skills and functional liter-
acy testing, claimants contend that such tests are arbitrary and capri-
cious' 30 or fundamentally unfair,' 3' rather than violative of other specific
125. Unlike mandatory injunctions, such as the relief requested in the Mt. Healthy case,
prohibitory injunctions are designed to retain the status quo. Generally courts are less reluc-
tant to issue prohibitory injunctions than they are to issue mandatory injunctions, which
require a showing of very serious injury. See Clune v. Publishers' Ass'n, 214 F. Supp. 520
(S.D.N.Y. 1963), afjd, 314 F.2d 343 (2d Cir. 1963); Costello v. Wainwright, 539 F.2d 547
(5th Cir. 1976).
126. 435 U.S. at 260.
127. Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1988).
128. 435 U.S. at 257 n.ll.
129. The Act provides, in relevant part:
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1982, 1983,
1985 and 1986 of this title, . . . or in any civil action or proceedings, by or on
behalf of the United States of America, to enforce . . . title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C. 2000d et seq.], the court, in its discretion, may allow the
prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of
the costs.
130. The phrase "arbitrary and capricious" is a critical concept in administrative law, see,
e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971), and is ex-
plicitly included in the Administrative Procedure Act as a standard for judicial review of
agency action. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976).
131. The standard of review applied to substantive due process cases of this genre has
not been clearly enunciated. Competency Testing, supra note 9, at 444 n.56. The phrases
"arbitrary and capricious," and "fundamentally unfair" appear to be the most frequently
used. Regardless of the exact wording of the test under substantive due process, the general
standard is that state action cannot be unreasonable, with unreasonableness being construed
narrowly. Id
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constitutional rights.' 32 Under the rubric of the arbitrary and capricious
or fundamental unfairness tests, this variation of substantive due proc-
ess 133 subsumes a variety of nonprocedural but traditional legal values
protected by the principle of justice in criminal law; that is, the principle
that demands that there be no crime without a law defining the crime, and
no punishment without an act that falls within the definition of the
crime. 134 Transposed into the language of civil actions, this maxim can be
restated as follows: no infraction can exist without a rule predefining re-
quired behavior and no disciplinary penalty can be imposed in the absence
of an act or deficiency that falls within the definition of the preexisting
rule. 35
Two kinds of challenges to basic skills and functional literacy testing
have been formulated on substantive due process grounds. The first arises
if there is a rule or norm established by educators, but no act or deficiency
on the part of the student. This type of challenge is exemplified by St. Ann
v. Palisi,136 a case dealing with nonacademic disciplinary matters. In
132. The umbrella of substantive due process has historically protected those rights rec-
ognized by the judiciary as fundamental but not expressly delineated in the Constitution.
Perry, supra note 63, at 419. Although for a time the doctrine was scuttled from the vocabu-
lary of modem civil liberties cases, e.g. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963), the
Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed the vitality of the doctrine for use in the privacy area
as one expressing the "concept of personal liberty." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
See also Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-99 n.23 (1977); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 500 (Harlan, J., concurring) ("[t]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment stands .... on its own bottom .... While the relevant inquiry may be aided by
resort to one or more of the provisions of the Bill of Rights, it is not dependent on them or
any of their radiations.")
133. Within this meaning of substantive due process, the word "substantive" is some-
times but not always retained, an inconsistency which leads to confusion as to whether the
issue in the case is really substantive or procedural.. Compare Esteban v. Central Missouri
State College, 415 F.2d 1077, 1087 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970) with
Soglin v. Kauffman, 418 F.2d 163, 167 (7th Cir. 1969). Nonetheless in the words of Justice
Harlan,
Were due process merely a procedural safeguard it would fail to reach those situa-
tions where the deprivation of life, liberty or property was accomplished by legisla-
tion which by operating in the future could, given even thefairest possibleprocedure
in application to individuals, nevertheless destroy the enjoyment of all three ...
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 541 (1961)(Harlan, J., dissenting, emphasis added). Accord-
ingly, because the concept of substantive due process clearly protects the rights discussed in
this article, the term substantive due process will be used for purposes of this discussion.
134. See generally J. SHKLAR, LEGALISM 151-70 and LAFAVE & ScoTT, HANDBOOK ON
CRIMINAL LAW § 24, (1972).
135. The idea of casting this variation of substantive due process into the framework of a
civil analog of the principle of legality in criminal law is that of the author, although the
Fifth Circuit, in St. Ann v. Palisi, came close to doing so. 495 F.2d 423 (5th Cir. 1974). See
text accompanying notes 136-38 infra.
136. 495 F.2d 423 (5th Cir. 1974).
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1974, the Fifth Circuit held that the suspension of children from school,
pursuant to a school board regulation authorizing suspension when par-
ents of the children reproved teachers in an offensive manner, violated the
substantive due process rights of the children. In Palisi, there was a rule,
but there was no act or dereliction on the part of the children penalized by
suspension. This, the court stated, violated the cardinal notion of liberty
that individuals cannot be punished without personal guilt. 137 To justify
such a significant encroachment upon a basic due process guarantee, the
state must satisfy the "substantial burden" of showing a compelling state
interest that was furthered by the regulation. 38
Reasoning by analogy to the type of violation exemplified by Palisi, one
commentator has argued that certain competency tests may be vulnerable
to constitutional attack on substantive due process grounds if a failure to
score at the required levels of reading and reading comprehension be-
comes the basis for the denial of a diploma.' 39 If a plaintiff could sustain
the burden of proving that the test instrument lacked instructional valid-
ity 4 0-- that it measured what in fact was never taught in the schools-then
137. Id. at 426-27. The court noted that "freedom from punishment in the absence of
personal guilt is a fundamental concept in the American scheme of justice." Id at 425
(emphasis in original). See also Cook v. Edwards, 341 F. Supp. 307 (D.N.H. 1972), in which
the district court referred to the fundamental unfairness of indefinitely expelling a fifteen
year old from high school because of difficulty between the student and her parents. The
difficulty had led to the student's appearance at school in an intoxicated state, but did not
manifest itself in disruptive behavior. While the court approved of the idea of a definite,
temporary suspension for the offense of appearing drunk on school premises, it suggested
that the severity of indefinite expulsion raised "a serious question of substantive due proc-
ess." 341 F. Supp. at 311. It is not clear whether it was the severity of the penalty for the
offense of appearing drunk or the school punishment for difficulties at home that raised the
substantive due process question. While the two problems need not be treated in isolation, a
severe punishment, such as an indefinite expulsion, meted out for a minor transgression may
imply that part of the penalty has no reference to any specific acts.
138. 495 F.2d at 427 (emphasis in original). This burden included proof that reasonable
alternative means were not available to meet the declared goal of the regulation. Id at 428.
For a fuller discussion of the various standards used in substantive due process cases, see
McClung, The Problem of the Due Process Exclusion: Do Schools Ha'e a Continuing Respon-
sibility to Educate Children with Behapior Problems?, 3 J. LAW & EDUc. 491 (1974).
139. Competency Testing, supra note 9, at 446-47. McClung was referring to Palm Beach
Florida's Adult Performance Level Test of reading and comprehension levels and to appli-
cations of "accrued learning in 'real life' situations." Id at 439 and n.i.
140. Id at 447. McClung's analysis is based on the concept of "instructional validity,"
and measures whether schools actually provide students with instruction in the types of
knowledge and skills that the competency test is designed to measure. Id at 446 n.70. It is
not, as McClung notes, a concept included within the American Psychological Association's
Standards for Education and Psychological Tests (1971). Furthermore, his concept of in-
structional validity is more exigent than the notion of curriculum validity, "a measure of
how well test items represent the objectives of the curriculum to which the test takers have
been exposed." Id (emphasis added).
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the denial of the diploma could be said to inflict punishment without cul-
pable shortcomings on the part of the student. As the children in Palisi
were punished for the guilt of the parents, so a number of high school
seniors would be punished, if not for the guilt of the schools, then at least
for the contributory deficiences of the educational system as measured
against the prescribed goals of the competency testing program.
A second type of substantive due process challenge arises when there is
an act or deficiency on the part of the student, but there is allegedly inade-
quate prior notice of the standard that the student is required to meet. In
contrast to the timely notice requirement which features so prominently in
procedural due process,' 4 1 the notice inquiry in substantive due process
challenges is concerned with whether there is any preexisting rule or norm
141. In its strictly procedural sense timely notice refers to notice of charges of violations
of an acceptably clear, preexisting rule or law, and it is required not only to apprise the
accused of what it is he must defend himself against, but to afford adequate time to prepare
a defense for disciplinary hearings or for a criminal trial. As Professor Fuller once put it,
"the first desideratum of a system for subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules is
an obvious one: there must be rules." L. FULLER, LAW AND MORALITY 46 (1965).
The immediate corollary of Professor Fuller's statement is that criminal laws that are so
vague that they do not indicate any ascertainable standard of conduct may be specious laws.
Accordingly, they may be vulnerable to constitutional attack under the "void for vagueness"
doctrine. See, e.g., Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 404 (1966) ("some misconduct"
as part of a jury instruction is too vague); United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S.
81 (1921) (statute penalizing "any unjust or unreasonable rate or charge in handling or deal-
ing in or with necessaries" is void for vagueness). One purpose of this due process doctrine
is to prevent arbitrary and capricious state action by subjecting disciplinary and law enforce-
ment officials to reasonably clear guidelines. See generally Grayned v. City of Rockford,
408 U.S. 104, 108 (1974); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972). The
requirement of clarity also affords individuals fair notice and warning of the civil or penal
consequences of their conduct.
One court explicitly referred to the void for vagueness doctrine as a substantive due proc-
ess concept. Esteban v. Central Missouri State College, 415 F.2d 1077, 1087 (8th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970). It has also been depicted simply as a due process concept.
See, e.g., Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572-73 (1973); Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S.
at 404 (1968). But see also Young v. American Mini Theaters, 427 U.S. 50, 59 (1976), cate-
gorizing a vague statute's inadequacy of notice as a matter of procedural due process. If the
vagueness doctrine is viewed as a facet of procedural due process it is because it shares the
fair warning rationale that underpins the notice requirements for a fair hearing. It is the
emphasis on preventing unbridled penal or disciplinary discretion that would seem to give it
its substantive due process flavor. When the vagueness doctrine is invoked in first amend-
ment free expression challenges, however, the statute can be invalidated merely because of
its chilling effect on constitutionally protected activity. Compare NAACP v. Button, 371
U.S. 415, 432-33 (1963) (if first amendment context requires an examination of a statute's
possible applications to situations other than the case at bar to determine whether void for
vagueness applies) with United States v. National Dairy Prod. Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 36 (1963)
(in nonfirst amendment contexts, the Court will only examine the specific conduct to which a
statute is being applied in determining whether the provision is void for vagueness). For a
further discussion of this doctrine's relation to school disciplinary actions, see note 183 infra.
[Vol. 28:469
Constitutional Challenges of "Everystudent"
in light of which one can adjust one's behavior. In Mahavongsanan v.
Hall,142 for example, a graduate student in the College of Education at
Georgia State University sued for the award of her master's degree claim-
ing, among other things, that the addition of a comprehensive examination
as a degree requirement following her enrollment was "inherently unfair"
because she had not received timely notice of the requirement prior to
commencing her graduate studies.' 43 This notice demanded by substan-
tive due process has been used to challenge competency prerequisites for a
high school diploma when such prerequisites are introduced without a
phase-in strategy affording both students and teachers adequate lead-time
to orient learning and teaching to the objectives of the tests. 44
Challenges to basic skills competency testing brought under the banner
of substantive due process may nonetheless encounter an inhospitable ju-
diciary. Case law, especially the recent Supreme Court decision of Board
of Curators of the University of Missouri v. Horowitz, 45 suggests that it
may be very difficult for "everystudent" to carry these two kinds of sub-
stantive due process claims across the imprecise conceptual frontier sepa-
rating disciplinary from academic affairs. The primary focus of Horowitz,
the first Supreme Court decision to address constitutional challenges to
academic evaluations of students, dealt with the plaintiff's claim that her
dismissal from medical school for poor performance in her clinical work
violated her right to procedural due process. Assuming that Horowitz had
the prerequisite liberty or property interest in pursuing a medical career, 1
46
a unanimous Court held that because she had been "fully informed" that
her continued enrollment was in jeopardy and because the decision to dis-
miss her was "careful and deliberate," she received all the process she was
due. 147 Consequently, Horowitz was not entitled to any kind of academic-
administrative hearing. 148 Distinguishing the nature of a factual investiga-
142. 401 F. Supp. 381 (N.D. Ga. 1975), rev'd, 529 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1976). For a further
discussion of this case, see notes 163 and accompanying text infra.
143. 401 F. Supp. at 383.
144. Competency Testing, supra note 9, at 444. The failure of the state to provide stu-
dents with sufficient notice to prepare for Florida's test is included among the charges in
Debra P. v. Turlington, No. 78-892 (M.D. Fla., filed Oct. 16, 1978).
145. 435 U.S. 78 (1978).
146. Id at 84-85. The Supreme Court has indicated conclusively, however, that high
school students do have a property interest in education. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565,
574 (1975).
147. 435 U.S. at 85.
148. In a footnote, the Court concluded "that considering all relevant factors, including
the evaluative nature of the inquiry and the significant and historically supported interest of
the school in preserving its present framework for academic evaluations, a hearing is not
required by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id at 86 n.3.
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tion of misconduct from an inquiry into the quality of academic perform-
ance, the Court invoked the language of a vintage 1913 Massachusetts case
involving the formulation and application of scholastic standards to a
ninth grade student: "A public hearing may be regarded as helpful to the
ascertainment of misconduct and useless or harmful in finding out the
truth as to scholarship."'' 49
The Supreme Court's opinion did not deal exclusively with Horowitz's
claim that she was entitled to an adversary hearing under the auspices of
the University. Additionally, six justices specifically rejected Horowitz's
substantive due process claim that her dismissal was "arbitrary and capri-
cious."' 150 The Court noted that even if the arbitrary and capricious test
were the proper standard for judicial review of an academic decision, an
issue not before the Court, no such showing had been made.' 5 ' What is
more, the Court emphatically stated that "[c]ourts are particularly ill-
equipped to evaluate academic performance,"' 152 and, in concluding,
warned against "any such judicial intrusion into academic decisionmak-
ing.,,153
The forceful treatment of Horowitz's substantive due process claim can
be read as sapping the potential of most, if not all, due process challenges
to academic evaluations of students. The issue was not, as it would be in a
first amendment challenge, whether the medical school faculty and admin-
istrators had violated, in.the name of academic decisionmaking, a specific
149. Id. at 87 (quoting Barnard v. Inhabitants of Shelbourne, 216 Mass. 19, 22-23, 102
N.E. 1095, 1097 (1913)).
150. Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Brennan disassociated themselves from Justice
Rehnquist's substantive due process discussion. Justice Marshall, the most outspoken of the
three, castigated the majority for unnecessarily reaching out to decide the substantive due
process question since it had not been reached by the court of appeals and because it in-
volved a wide range of issues that had not been distinguished or analyzed. 435 U.S. at 107.
151. Id. at 91-92. The Court did not purport to evaluate this judicial standard. More-
over, in reference to Horowitz's additional claim that the school failed to follow its own
rules, the Court noted that reliance on prior administrative law cases was inappropriate
since such cases "enunciate[d] principles of federal administrative law rather than of consti-
tutional law binding upon the States." Id at 92, n.8.
Horowitz alleged that she had been subjected to more stringent standards in the evalua-
tion of her performance than other students because of her sex, religion, and personal ap-
pearance. The Supreme Court accepted the district court's determination that these factors
played no role in the evaluation of her performance, and therefore no showing of arbitrari-
ness and capriciousness had been made. 435 U.S. at 92 n.7. To place her claim within the
framework of the two types of substantive due process claims discussed in this section,
Horowitz alleged in effect that the failure to apply professional standards in an evenhanded
manner to all students contravened the notion underlying the uniform application of rules.
In other words, in her case there were acts, but allegedly no bona fide standards or norms.
152. 435 U.S. at 92 (dictum).
153. Id
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right contained in or read into the Bill of Rights. Rather, the issue was
whether a professional academic judgment was arbitrary and capricious as
measured against professional norms, and concurrently, whether a court-
room is a proper forum for resolving such disputes. In drawing a sharp
line between "academic evaluations" and disciplinary determinations, 54
the Horowitz Court cited with approval the Barnard holding that courts
should generally refrain from scrutinizing the formulation and application
of academic standards. 5 5 In disposing of Horowitz's substantive due
154. 435 U.S. at 87, 91 n.6.
155. Id. at 87, 90 (citing Barnard v. Inhabitants of Shelbourne, 216 Mass. 19, 102 N.E.
1095 (1913)). Although this case was quoted in the Court's discussion of Horowitz's proce-
dural claim, its authority apparently carried over to the discussion of her substantive due
process claim as well. The Court observed that "the factors discussed ... with respect to
procedural due process speak afortiori" to claims of arbitrary and capricious evaluations of
academic performance. 435 U.S. at 92. The Court's reliance on Barnard, which involved
secondary students, indicates the Court's deference to the professional judgment of educa-
tors was not confined to those in higher professional education.
In the Barnard case, the plaintiff brought an unsuccessful state common law tort claim for
damages for wrongful exclusion from the public high school of Shelbourne. The Massachu-
setts Supreme Court adopted the position that courts must refrain from scrutinizing the for-
mulation and application of academic standards unless the plaintiff can make a clear
showing of bad faith on the part of school officials. 216 Mass. at 21, 102 N.E. at 1096.
Accord, Gaspar v. Bruton, 513 F.2d 843, 850 (10th Cir. 1975). The Horowitz opinion made
no reference to this standard. In Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975), however, the
Supreme Court enunciated the standard of qualified good faith immunity of individuals
from damages under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976), which affords a
private cause of action for violations of the fourteenth amendment. See note 115 supra.
The Court concluded, in part, that the defendants would be liable if they had either "mali-
cious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury to the student"
or had acted with "such disregard" of students' "clearly established constitutional rights"
that their actions could not "reasonably be characterized as being in good faith." 420 U.S. at
322. For a fuller discussion of Wood and its implications concerning an official's qualified
immunity in § 1983 actions, see Yudof, Liability for Constitutional Torts and the Risks -
Averse Public School Official, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 1332 (1976); Comment, Constitutional
Law-- 1983 Qualified School Board Immunity, 6 MEMPHIS ST. UNIV. L. REV. 125 (1975);
The Supreme Court, 1974 Term 89 HARV. L. REV. 47, 219 (1975); Note, Government Immu-
nityj-Qualified Immunity for School Board Members-A Standard for Determining Good
Faith Under 42 U.S C Section 1983, 11 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 720 (1975).
In the later decision of Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658
(1978), the Supreme Court overruled its earlier decision of Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167
(1961), and held that local governing bodies, including local school boards and local officials
sued in their official capacities, are "persons" within the meaning of § 1983 and can there-
fore be sued directly for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief. Thus, plaintiffs con-
testing competency examinations may sue a local school board as an entity, rather than
suing individual board members. In ruling that local governments and local officials are not
absolutely immune from suit when official policy "of some nature," is allegedly responsible
for deprivation of constitutional rights, the Court refused to discuss the scope of a qualified
municipal immunity. 436 U.S. at 691. Therefore the Court did not decide whether the
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process claim, the Court suggested in effect that courts lack even minimal
competence to evaluate the academic judgments of educators.
If it is a fair reading of Horowitz that federal courts have very little
business taking their constitutional in territory which educators have tradi-
tionally staked out for the exercise of their sovereign professional discre-
tion, then "everystudent's" claim that basic skills and functional literacy
tests are arbitrary and capricious because they lack instructional validity is
not likely to prevail. Although neither Horowitz nor the lower court cases
cited by the Horowitz Court 5 6 involved challenges to the use of standard-
ized tests, the Court's expressed reluctance to evaluate the academic judg-
ment of educators would presumably extend to educational determinations
that skills tested had been adequately taught in school. 157
qualified good faith immunity test announced in Wood v. Strickland is applicable to suits
against school boards rather than individual members.
It should be noted that since Monell limited its holding to local government units, which
are not part of the state for eleventh amendment purposes, state boards of education con-
tinue to enjoy immunity from § 1983 suits. For a discussion of the relationship between §
1983 and eleventh amendment immunity of state universities and state agencies, see Clague,
Suing the University "Black Box" under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 62 IOWA L. REV. 337,
361-79 (1976).
156. See, e.g., Gaspar v. Bruton, 513 F.2d 843 (10th Cir. 1975); Mustell v. Rose, 282 Ala.
358, 211 So. 2d 489, cert. denied 393 U.S. 936 (1968).
157. Certainly this is not because the courts are strangers to the task of evaluating the
legality of standardized tests which have been used for the selection, exclusion, and place-
ment of students in schools. See, e.g., Moses v. Washington Parish School Bd., 456 F.2d
1285 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1013 (1972); Lemon v. Bossier Parish School Bd., 444
F.2d 1400 (5th Cir. 1971); Larry P. v. Riles, 343 F. Supp. 1306 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Serna v.
Portales Mun. School Dist., 351 F. Supp. 1279 (D.N.M. 1972), affid, 499 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir.
1974); Bray v. Lee, 337 F. Supp. 934 (D. Mass. 1972). The courts have also evaluated stan-
dardized tests used to hire or to certify professionals. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426
U.S. 229 (1976) (positive relationship between employment test and police training program
satisfies both constitutional and statutory standards, "wholly aside from its possible relation-
ship to actual performance as a police officer"); United States v. South Carolina, 445 F.
Supp. 1094 (D.S.C. 1977), aff'd, 434 U.S. 1026 (1978) (upholding the use of the National
Teachers Examination for certification of teachers); Tyler v. Vickery, 517 F.2d 1089 (5th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 940 (1976) (upholding bar exam as method of certifying attor-
neys). But when standardized tests have been attacked, the plaintiffs generally have not
been "everystudent." Rather, they have been litigants who, typically as a judicially recog-
nized "class" in class action lawsuits, share certain racial, linguistic, ethnic or sexual attrib-
utes. They have challenged the differential and allegedly discriminatory impact that these
tests have on their class, basing their challenge either on equal protection or the federal civil
rights laws. See generally Trachtenburg & Jacoby, Pupil Testing. A Legal View, 59 Phi
Delta Kappan 249 (1977).
In January, 1978, the Supreme Court summarily affirmed the district court's opinion in
United States v. South Carolina, 434 U.S. 1026 (1978), affg, 445 F. Supp. 1094 (D.S.C.
1977). The district court had held the state's use of the National Teacher Examination
(NTE), used to certify teachers as minimally competent, satisfied both the fourteenth
amendment's equal protection clause and the statutory standard under Title VII of the Civil
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Thus, "everystudent" is likely to find himself on the same footing as the
public school teacher who challenges the fairness of assessments made of
his professional competence. For example, in Scheelhaase v. Woodbury
Central Community School District,158 the Eighth Circuit upheld the firing
of an Iowa teacher, dismissed because of the relatively low test scores her
students received in the Iowa Tests of Basic Skills and Basic Development.
The district court had ordered her reinstatement, concluding that a
teacher's competence could not be determined solely on the basis of such
scores, and thus that her termination was arbitrary and capricious. 59 On
appeal the Eighth Circuit reversed, stating that "[s]uch matters as the com-
petency of teachers, and the standards of its measurement are not, without
more, matters of constitutional dimensions."' 160
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2 (1976), in the absence of proof of intent to discrimi-
nate and in spite of the disproportionate impact on blacks. While the district court found
that the NTE had met the requirements of "a professionally designed and executed validity
study," 445 F. Supp. at 1109, it did not mandate this kind of validation as a defense against
an equal protection challenge. Id The NTE case deals with professional certification rather
than graduation from high school. It seems reasonable to infer, however, that if the courts
do not require a "validity study" to demonstrate "the relationship between a challenged use
of a test and the governmental objective for which it is being used," id, in the sensitive area
of racial discrimination, they are not very likely to respond to the constitutional challenges
of "everystudent."
158. 349 F. Supp. 988 (N.D. Iowa 1972), rev'd, 488 F.2d 237 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
417 U.S. 969 (1975). No issue of procedural due process was involved since the plaintiff had
been given a hearing.
159. 349 F. Supp. at 990.
160. 488 F.2d at 244. The court went on to note that "[tihey are peculiarly appropriate to
state and local administration." Id Although the analysis was not entirely clear, the court
apparently refused to apply the arbitrary and capricious standard to cases in which the
school board lacked a factual basis for its decision unless the school board had first sub-
jected the teacher to public charges. Id at 242 and n.8. The opinion began by deferring to
the discretion of the Board, even if it had "been exercised with a lack of wisdom." Id at
237.
The rest of the majority's opinion focused on the concept that "absent contractual, legisla-
tive or constitutional provisions .. , government employment can be revoked at the will of
the appointing officer." Id at 244 (quoting Harnett v. Ulett, 466 F.2d 113, 117 (8th Cir.
1972)). The Scheelhaase court apparently was guided by the position in Board of Regents v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), holding that terminated untenured teachers have no procedural
due process right to either a hearing or even a statement of the reasons not to rehire. Under
Roth, even if the untenured teacher is entitled to a hearing, as when reasons have been made
public that are damaging to his reputation, the only purpose of the hearing is to clear his
name. The employer is still free to deny him employment. Id at 572 and n.12. See also
Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (proof of a property interest in a job derived from
state law entitles a teacher to a hearing at which he would be informed of the reasons for
nonretention, but does not require reinstatement). Apparently the court in Scheelhaase con-
cluded from Roth that since no reasons need be given for termination, a court is not free to
determine if such reasons are arbitrary and capricious in the absence of public stigma. See
488 F.2d at 242 and n.8. See also Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976) (no right to a hearing
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The other type of substantive due process claim-that students must re-
ceive adequate notice requiring them to pass a basic skills test before re-
ceiving a diploma-remains the most viable substantive due process
challenge not foreclosed by Horowitz. The Court's warning in Horowitz
against "any such judicial intrusion into academic decision-making" fol-
lowed its declaration that courts lack the special expertise necessary to
evaluate "academic performance."161 The neat verbal dichotomy between
disciplinary actions and academic decisions that provided the framework
for the Court's noninterventionist philosophy blurs if a distinction is
drawn, within the category of academic decisions, between evaluations of
student performance and evaluations of academic regulations.
In dismissing Horowitz's substantive due process claim, the Court re-
ferred to dicta in lower court cases implying that courts enjoy some limited
prerogative to enjoin academic dismissals from public institutions when
the dismissals are clearly arbitrary and capricious. 62 Mahavongsanan v.
Hall, for example, challenged the arbitrary timing of an academic regula-
tion, rather than the educational evaluation of student performance. 63
to clear name when reasons for discharge not made in public, notwithstanding claim that
reasons were false and portentially damaging to reputation).
The Court's position regarding teachers may well be different from its position regarding
students. Failure to graduate from high school is arguably sufficient public stigma to war-
rant the use of the arbitrary and capricious standard. Unlike terminated teachers, who are
not "foreclosed" from taking "other employment opportunities," Roth, 408 U.S. at 573, stu-
dents failing to get high school diplomas are clearly precluded from many types of jobs.
Moreover, unlike the untenured teachers in Roth and Scheelhaase, students clearly have a
property interest in public education and when suspended for disciplinary actions, must be
given notice of the charges and an opportunity to rebut them. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565
(1975).
161. 435 U.S. at 92 (emphasis added).
162. Id at 91 (citing Mahavongsanan v. Hall, 529 F.2d 448, 449 (5th Cir. 1976) and
Gaspar v. Bruton, 513 F.2d 843, 850 (10th Cir. 1975)). In Gaspar, a nursing student alleged
that her dismissal from school for academic deficiences was "unreasonable, arbitrary and
capricious, and that she was deprived of a property right .... " 513 F.2d at 846 (emphasis in
original.) The Tenth Circuit, rejecting her claim, concluded that "when presented with a
challenge that the school authorities suspended or dismissed a student for failure re (sic)
academic standards, the court may grant relief, as a practical matter, only in those cases
where the student presents positive evidence of ill will or bad motive." Id at 851. Thus,
although the court recognized that it may apply the arbitrary and capricious standard to
academic dismissals, id at 850, it apparently limited the standard to "ill will" or "bad mo-
tive."
163. 529 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1976). See text accompanying notes 142-43 supra. The Fifth
Circuit found, on the particular facts, that revised academic requirements for a masters de-
gree did provide sufficient notice to permit the plaintiff to prepare herself intellectually for
the challenge of a comprehensive evaluation. The court found that she had been given
"timely notice" that she would be required to take a comprehensive examination and "am-
ple notice" to prepare for the second examination following her failure of the first. More-
over, she was given a "reasonable opportunity to complete additional course work in lieu of
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Although the plaintiff's claim was defeated on the merits, the court did not
abjure all judicial consideration of the fairness of academic regulations as
beyond the competence of the federal courts. Nor does Horowitz's elusive
treatment of the distinction between judicial evaluation of student aca-
demic performance and judicial assessment of the fundamental fairness of
academic regulation unequivocally foreclose substantive due process chal-
lenges to the adequacy of notice for which a number of competency testing
programs might be constitutionally faulted. As previously indicated, sud-
denly conditioning the granting of a high school diploma upon the passage
of a competency test could arguably fail a "timely notice" requirement
without some phase-in strategy, affording both students and teachers ade-
quate lead-time to orient learning and teaching to the objectives of the
tests. 164 Challenging the fairness of the timing of academic requirements
would not drag the courts into evaluations of student academic perform-
ance. Rather, adequate prior notice necessarily implicates legal values of
which the courts are traditional guardians outside the educational arena.
Whether the present Supreme Court would endorse a limited judicial in-
cursion into academic decisionmaking and require that high school exit
tests be grandfathered 165 is not answered by the language of the Horowitz
opinion, since a clear distinction between academic requirements and aca-
demic performance was neither drawn or disavowed. The dicta of lower
courts that dismissals from public educational institutions can be over-
turned if "shown to be clearly arbitrary or capricious" was neither en-
dorsed nor repudiated. 166
the comprehensive examination." 529 F.2d at 448, 450. Thus, neither procedural nor sub-
stantive due process was denied. Id
164. See text accompanying note 144 supra. The decision in Florida State Bd. of Educ.
v. Brady, 368 So. 2d 661 (Dist. Ct. App. 1979), upholding the scoring criterion adopted by
the State Commissioner of Education, was based on an interpretation of Florida statutes.
See note 9 supra. But the state court also noted the relevance of the Horowitz decision's
emphasis on judicial nonintervention in matters of academic evaluations of students for
circumstances presented by the Brady case: failure of an "evenly administered" competency
test by an 11th grade student who was afforded ample opportunity to correct his deficiencies
before any determination would be made as to his entitlement to graduate. 368 So. 2d at
663. Under these conditions the court added, "[h]e should appreciate rather than complain
about the education system in Florida .... " id.
165. If the courts were to require that exit tests be "grandfathered," the grade levels
affected would presumably depend on the nature of the skills tested.
166. See 435 U.S. at 91. See note 151 supra. As one commentator has noted, lower
courts "could foreseeably transform the 'careful and deliberate' procedural due process stan-
dard in Horowitz into a disguised substantive due process test by holding that a 'grossly
inequitable' academic dismissal could not have resulted from a 'careful and deliberate' con-
sideration of a student's scholastic performance." Pavela, Judicial Review ofAcademic Deci-
sionmaking After Horowitz, 8 NOLPE SCHOOL L.J. 55, 60 (1979). As Pavela also points out,
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Although Horowitz does not definitively preclude judicial review of high
school exit test requirements allegedly introduced without "timely notice,"
nonetheless, other Supreme Court decisions suggest that judicial scrutiny
at the behest of "everystudent" is problematic. The Court's concern with
the limits of judicial competence is not the only factor accounting for its
reluctance to intervene in academic affairs. In several recent education
decisions, the Court has repeatedly acknowledged that legal proceedings
are not always appropriate for resolving conflicts peculiar to educational
settings. Even in territory clearly identified as disciplinary, in which the
educator's discretion has been subjected to constitutional restraints, the
Court has tread lightly.
In Goss v. Lopez, 167 the leading decision addressing the extent of proce-
dural protections required in short-term disciplinary suspensions, the
Court imposed only the most "rudimentary" notice and hearing require-
ments to safeguard against "unfair or mistaken" findings of misconduct. 68
In requiring these procedural guarantees, the majority sought to limit them
to, and equate them with, what it believed would be sound educational
practice. 169 The Horowitz majority appeared even less willing to impose
procedural restraints on the exercise of educator's academic judgments.
Quoting from Justice Powell's dissenting opinion in Goss, 170 the Horowitz
Court emphasized the nonadversarial and informal nature of faculty-stu-
dent relationships, stressing the multitude of roles necessarily played by a
teacher.' 7 ' Moreover, in a more recent decision, the Court refused to limit
state court decisions which have examined the fairness of academic decisions under several
other legal theories, were not invalidated by the Horowitz opinion. Id at 55.
167. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
168. Id at 581. For suspensions up to ten days, the Court required only that a student be
given written or oral notice of the charges, with an explanation of the evidence, and an
opportunity to "present his side of the story." Id
169. In requiring informal, rudimentary due process procedures, the Court stated: "we
do not believe that we have imposed procedures on school disciplinarians which are inap-
propriate in a classroom setting. Instead we have imposed requirements which are, if any-
thing, less than a fair-minded school principal would impose upon himself in order to avoid
unfair suspensions." 419 U.S. at 583.
170. Justice Powell, with whom Justices Burger, Blackmun and Rehnquist joined, dis-
sented vigorously from the Court's imposition of a requirement of a notice and hearing prior
to or immediately after a suspension. They argued that whatever infringement occurred did
not "justify imposition of a constitutional rule." Id at 586. They warned that the decision
would "sweep within the protected interest in education a multitude of discretionary deci-
sions in the educational process," including academic evaluations. Id at 597. The Horowitz
decision, written by Justice Rehnquist, apparently adopted the dissenters' position in Goss
that judicial intrusion into school policy should be limited.
171. The Court stated that a teacher "must occupy many roles-educator, advisor,
friend, and at times, parent-substitute." 435 U.S. at 90 (quoting Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565,
594 (Powell, J. dissenting)). Justice Powell noted in Goss that courts have "relied for genera-
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the school disciplinarian's discretionary infliction of corporal punishment
by constitutionally required prior procedural precautions. 172 Thus the
Court has refused to impede the flexibility essential to the educational
process by imposing stringent procedural requirements in school settings.
If the Supreme Court has been modest in its imposition of constitution-
ally-guaranteed procedural rights in school disciplinary cases, it has been
openly reluctant to entertain substantive due process claims alleging the
absence of a preexisting rule governing the unlawful act. Indeed, in Wood
v. Strickland, 173 the Court came very close to precluding all judicial review
of the meaning of school disciplinary rules. In Strickland, two girls were
expelled from high school for the admitted deed of adding malt liquor to a
punch served at a school-related activity. They later claimed that their
substantive due process rights had been violated because the malt liquor
did not qualify an intoxicating beverage under state law. 174 Satisfied that
the liquor nevertheless came within the school board's nontechnical defini-
tion of intoxicating beverage, the Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Cir-
cuit's finding of a substantive due process violation. It warned federal
courts against setting aside "decisions of school administrators which the
court may view as lacking a basis in wisdom or compassion."' 175 The
Court further stated that the Civil Rights Act of 1871176 "does not extend
the right to relitigate in federal court evidentiary questions arising in
school disciplinary proceedings or the proper construction of school regula-
tions."' 77 A policy of little or no judicial intervention in disputes over the
tions upon the experience, good faith and dedication of those who staff our public schools."
419 U.S. at 595.
172. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 683 (1977). The Court also found that the eighth
amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment is not applicable to corporal
punishment in the schools. Id at 682.
173. 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
174. The Eighth Circuit had held that the girls were denied substantive due process be-
cause the school board failed to determine whether "Right-Time" was an intoxicating bever-
age. Strickland v. Inlow, 485 F.2d 186, 190 (8th Cir. 1973), rev'd sub nom. Wood v.
Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
175. 420 U.S. at 326.
176. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). See notes 115 and cases discussed in note 155 supra.
177. 420 U.S. at 326 (emphasis added). Furthermore, it is not clear to what degree the
Supreme Court would require that school regulations satisfy the specificity standard of the
criminal law's void for vagueness doctrine in dealing with disciplinary problems that do not
involve first amendment considerations. See note 141 supra. The circuit courts are split.
Some take the position that college conduct regulations are part of an educational process
and are not required to meet the standards of specificity demanded of the criminal code.
See, e.g., Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 415 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1969), cerl. denied,
398 U.S. 965 (1970). Others view disciplinary regulations as punitive and therefore analo-
gous to criminal statutes that must meet constitutional standards of specificity. See, e.g.,
Soglin v. Kauffman, 418 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1969). See general, Note, Vagueness Doctrine in
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proper construction of school disciplinary regulations would be likely to
extend, afortiori, to academic regulations.
Thus, in spite of the expanded policymaking role laid upon or assumed
by the federal courts, 78 challenges raised under the banner of substantive
due process to both disciplinary and academic assessments of "every-
student" may encounter the traditional judicial deference to educator dis-
cretion. 179
Federal Courts- A Focus on the Military, Prison, and Campus Contexts, 26 STAN. L. REV.
855, 879-82 and n. 138 [hereinafter cited as Vagueness Doctrine]. The Supreme Court has not
directly addressed the question of the application of this version of the vagueness doctrine to
school contexts. In Healy v. James, however, it quoted with approval that portion of Justice
Blackmun's Esteban opinion, written while he served on the Eighth Circuit, holding that a
college has the "inherent power" to "properly" discipline its students. 408 U.S. 169, 192
(1972) (quoting Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 415 F.2d 1077, 1089) (8th Cir. 1969)).
One commentator has suggested that the Esteban court's affirmation of an inherent power to
discipline "seems to mean that not only is there no need for precise rules on the campus, but
it is not necessary to make known in advance any rules at all-certainly the ultimate in
vagueness." Vagueness Doctrine, supra, at 879 n. 138. Since Healy is a first amendment case,
it should not necessarily be read to imply that the Supreme Court endorsed this commenta-
tor's extreme interpretation. Blackmun's statement was cited in Healy to support the propo-
sition that students may not flaunt reasonable campus regulations governing speech-related
activity. Since the existence of a valid rule governing applications for official recognition of
campus organizations was assumed, the Court did not have to "decide whether any particu-
lar formulation would or would not prove constitutionally acceptable." 408 U.S. at 193-94.
Although the Court permitted the students to advocate "doing away with any and all cam-
pus regulations," id at 192, it did not imply that the academic institution could do away
with rules in areas having nothing to do with first amendment concerns. The opinion of the
Court in Horowitz, however, contains a very significant footnote. It stated that the principle
that agencies must follow their own rules, enunciated in Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363
(1957), is a principle of federal administrative law and not of constitutional law binding
upon the states. 435 U.S. at 92 n.8. One could interpret this footnote to imply that although
state agencies may create rules of conduct, they are not constitutionally bound to follow
them once created. Thus, they may not be required to establish any disciplinary rules with
any degree of specificity.
178. See, e.g., D. HOROWiTZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY, (1978); Chayes, The
Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976).
179. To speculate on the particular constitutional questions covered in Part 1I of this
article isolates, of course, one piece of the larger puzzle of accountability for educational
outcomes. Substantive due process claims, raised by students who are denied a high school
diploma because they fail basic skills and functional literacy tests, seek to establish a balance
of responsibility between the educational system and the student. Alternative legal claims,
raised by functionally illiterate students who are graduated with rather than denied a high
school diploma, attempt to place the burden of financial accountability either on the educa-
tors and the school system, or on the diagnostic specialists and their employers. "Educa-
tional malpractice" claims, which allege negligent failure and breach of statutory duty to
teach have not been successful thus far. See, e.g., Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School
Dist., 64 App. Div. 2d 29, 407 N.Y.S. 2d 874 (1978); Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified
School Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 131 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1976). In both of these cases the state
courts refused to recognize a duty of instructional care because of the absence of a demon-
strable science of pedagogy which would provide criteria to assess and comprehend the al-
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III. CONCLUSION
Now that the litigation syndrome has invaded the once autonomous do-
main of education, a wide range of issues of educational policy have been
converted into legally framed questions for judicial resolution. So it is
with minimum competency testing.
How receptive the federal courts might be to "everystudent's" constitu-
tional challenge will depend in part on their assessment of judicial compe-
tence to evaluate the particular issues that are presented as well as their
concern with the excessive intrusion of legalism into the domain of educa-
tion. Possible first amendment challenges may arise if comprehensive
views of the mission of education are linked to student accountability and
translated into test items designed to assess the appropriateness or correct-
ness of attitudes, opinions or even behavior. The state's interest in scoring
student values on matters of politics, beauty, parenting, interpersonal
skills, cooperation, attitudes toward school and work, and sexual orienta-
tion has been rendered constitutionally suspect by Barnette and Tinker,
and possibly by Yoder. A judicial veto of compulsory value-testing would
not only further sound first amendment case law, it would also be conso-
nant with sensible educational policy. Barnette suggested the plausible hy-
pothesis that if testing invades the realm of individual attitudes and beliefs,
what the testers would most likely actually measure is the student's compe-
tence to "simulate assent by words without belief and by a gesture barren
of meaning." 80
Judicial support for privacy claims against intrusive value testing or as-
sessments would also be consonant with sound educational policy. Mer-
riken's support for student and parental privacy was coupled with a well-
founded concern about the potentially dangerous consequences to students
presented by the schools' drug program. The Supreme Court has never
considered the boundaries of a student's constitutionally protected right of
privacy. As Judge Wright emphasized, however, in his dissent in McMil-
lan, the compulsory nature of school attendance which diminishes the
freedom of students, combined with the "inherent nature of the teacher-
student relationship," '8' demands careful judicial scrutiny of intrusions on
leged wrongful conduct and injury. Thus, whereas federal courts eschew substantive due
process claims that would require judicial assessment of the fairness in application of evalu-
ative criteria internal to the educator's discipline, state courts will probably continue to es-
chew malpractice claims in the absence of a professionally-referenced, workable "rule of
care." 60 Cal. App. 3d at 822, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 861. As the New York court put it in the
Donohue case, "[tihe failure to learn does not bespeak a failure to teach." 407 N.Y.S. 2d at
881.
180. 319 U.S. at 633.
181. 459 F.2d at 1325.
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the privacy of students.' 82 Thus even though the Horowitz opinion
stressed that the special relationship of faculty and students should counsel
hesitation in imposing overly legalistic, adversarial procedures on the edu-
cational process, we may need an activist judiciary to protect the faculty-
student relationship, which is enhanced by an atmosphere of trust, from
mandates that infringe upon fundamental personal rights.
It is possible that a reticent judiciary might invoke Horowitz to recast
any free speech and privacy issues that competency testing might pose into
the framework that Justice Frankfurter had established in Gobitis. That is,
the courts could avoid the constitutional issue by treating value-oriented
questions or assessments as part of the process of evaluating academic per-
formance, hence as a matter on which they must defer to the superior ex-
pertise of educators. But such an artful dodge would subvert Barnette and
Tinker and distort Horowitz. The Horowitz majority did not renounce the
Court's authority to play the role of constitutional pedagogue to educators
when fundamental personal rights are violated by educational programs
and practices. While this role interjects the courts into issues of educa-
tional policy, the criteria that guide and limit judicial involvement are de-
rived from constitutional concepts. This was implicit in the Barnette
Court's justification for its application of the Bill of Rights to education.
The diffidence, on the other hand, with which the Horowitz opinion
treated Charlotte Horowitz's substantive due process complaint can be in-
terpreted as reluctance to engage in an evaluation of educators' assessment
of student academic performance using intellectual and behavioral criteria
internal to the educators' discipline. Having rejected the contention that
her dismissal was premised on irrelevant personal characteristics rather
than on her academic performance, this is the unwelcome consequence
that Justice Rehnquist, and those who joined in his majority opinion, ap-
parently envisaged.
This article is a speculative piece. As two commentators have stated,
"[florecasting the future of minimum-competency testing is as uncertain as
reading tea leaves.'183 State programs are in various stages of develop-
ment and reevaluation. Critics from the field of education have been vocal
and state legislatures may be showing signs of disenchantment. 8 4 Legal
182. Id
183. Haney & Madaus, supra note 1, at 477.
184. Speaking at the U.S. Office of Education's First Annual Conference on Basic Skills
in early December, 1978, Chris Pipho of the Education Commission of the States concluded
that legislative interest in competency testing as a prerequisite for graduation had peaked in
1978. REPORT ON EDUC. RESEARCH, December 13, 1978, at I.
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advice has been solicited 85 and lawsuits have been filed that have attuned
program developers to possible legal danger points.' 86 The weight to be
accorded to value-oriented components, to the extent that they are imple-
mented, is not yet determined. Although the requirements of substantive
due process are neither carefully articulated nor clearly applicable to edu-
cational settings, the legal concept of timely notice has already influenced
state planners, retroactively 87 as well as prospectively. 88 Minimum-com-
petency testing is not a dead horse, but it may become, during the course
of its grooming, a horse of a different and more healthy color.
185. See note 9 supra.
186. Ralph Turlington, Florida's new Commissioner of Education, the named defendant
in the case of Debra P. v. Turlington, No. 78-892 (M.D. Fla., filed Oct. 16, 1978), was quoted
in late December as saying that a state cabinet-level task force "recommends holding off on
a plan to withhold high school diplomas" this coming June. Report on Educ. Research,
December 27, 1978, at 3. The task force has also been quoted as saying that Florida's func-
tional literacy test was "too hastily constructed" and that the state can "cannot morally
justify" denying regular diplomas to this year's high school seniors. Id. In early spring,
however, the Florida legislature voted decisively not to delay the requirement that this year's
graduating seniors must have passed the 1978 competency test. Report on Educ. Research,
April 18, 1979, at 10. In May 1979, the Florida legislature reportedly passed a bill that
would provide a 13th year of remedial schooling for students who fail the statewide compe-
tency test, coupled with two added chances to pass the test. Report on Educ. Research, May
30, 1979, at 2.
187. The position taken by the task force appointed by Florida's Commissioner of Edu-
cation is a prime example. See notes 9 and 186 supra.
188. Maryland's testing scheme is illustrative. In light of legal challenges spawned by
Florida's hasty introduction of functional literacy and mathematics exams, see note 9 supra,
Maryland is delaying the addition of the math component to its testing program. Telephone
interview with Dr. Richard Petre, Director of Project Basic (Dec. 15, 1978).
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